RISK DISCLOSURE AGAINST ATTACK ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
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- YOSHIDA Mamoru
- 京都大学 大学院工学研究科都市社会工学専攻
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- KOBAYASHI Kiyoshi
- 京都大学 経営管理大学院経営管理講座
Bibliographic Information
- Other Title
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- 社会基盤テロリスクと情報開示
Abstract
This paper analyzes the government's defensive and disclosure strategies to reduce the damage caused by terrorists that attack critical infrastructures using subjective game theory. The government recognizes a terrorist as a hidden opponent and the government's decision making about the policies against terror attacks depends on the belief about the existence of terrorist. In addition, it is not necessarily true that the government and the terrorist play the common game and make their decisions. Considering these points, the paper formulates the model in which the government and the terrorist formulate the subjective games respectively, and they induce the strategies using the equilibriums of their subjective games. The paper concluded that the government's disclosure about the implementation of the countermeasure, rather than the disclosure of warning level related with the belief about the existence of terrorist, brings about the higher increment of the subjective payoffs of the government.
Journal
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- Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser. D3 (Infrastructure Planning and Management)
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Journal of Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Ser. D3 (Infrastructure Planning and Management) 67 (4), 510-527, 2011
Japan Society of Civil Engineers
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Details
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- CRID
- 1390282680333054720
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- NII Article ID
- 130004559483
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- ISSN
- 21856540
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- Data Source
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- JaLC
- Crossref
- CiNii Articles
- KAKEN
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- Abstract License Flag
- Disallowed