ADACHI Tsuyoshi 安達剛

Researcher Number	00535122
Other IDs
Affiliation (Current)	2025: 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 准教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help	2024: 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 准教授 2018 – 2020: 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 准教授 2015 – 2017: 高崎経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 2014: 高崎経済大学, 経済学部, 講師 2011 – 2013: 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手
Review Section/Research Field	Principal Investigator Economic theory / Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
Keywords	Principal Investigator 経済理論 / メカニズムデザイン / 非介入性 / 耐戦略性 / 遂行理論 / 厚生経済学 / 社会選択理論 / マキシマックス戦略 / マキシミン戦略 / strategy-proof … More / 支配戦略 / 展開型メカニズム / 正直なエージェント / ナッシュ遂行 / 逐次消去 / ボルダルール / 社会的選択理論 / ロバスト遂行 / セキュア遂行 / 第１価格オークション / マッチング / Strategy-proofness / Non-bossiness / オークション / ミクロ経済学 / ゲーム理論 / 逐次投票 / 順位決め Less

熟議デモクラシーを有効に機能させるための投票ルールの解明Principal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  安達剛
- Project Period (FY)
  2024 – 2027
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Waseda University
Secure implementation with extensive form mechanismPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Adachi Tsuyoshi
- Project Period (FY)
  2016 – 2020
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Waseda University
  Takasaki City University of Economics
Axiomatization of auction rules with non-bossinessPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Adachi Tsuyoshi
- Project Period (FY)
  2013 – 2015
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Takasaki City University of Economics
  Waseda University
The effecitiveness of the unanimity rule with sequential voting when jurors are unfair.Principal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  ADACHI Tsuyoshi
- Project Period (FY)
  2011 – 2012
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Waseda University

All 2019 2018 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

All Journal Article Presentation

[Journal Article] Further axiomatizations of Egghe's g-index2015
- Author(s)
  T. Adachi and T. Kongo
- Journal Title
  
  Journal of Informetrics
  
  Volume: 9 Issue: 4 Pages: 839-844
- DOI
  10.1016/j.joi.2015.07.001
- Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15K17031, KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780139
[Journal Article] Extended anonymity and Paretian relations on infinite utility streams2014
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi, Susumu Cato, Kohei Kamaga
- Journal Title
  
  Mathematical Social Sciences
  
  Volume: 72 Pages: 24-32
- DOI
  10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.10.002
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780139
[Journal Article] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2014
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Journal Title
  
  Games and Economic Behavior
  
  Volume: 87 Pages: 508-518
- DOI
  10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.003
- Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780139
[Journal Article] Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems2014
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Journal Title
  
  Games and Economic Behavior
  
  Volume: 86 Pages: 96-101
- DOI
  10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780139
[Journal Article] First-price auctions on general preferenrce domains: axiomatic characterizations2013
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi, Takumi Kongo
- Journal Title
  
  Economic Theory Bulletin
  
  Volume: 1 Issue: 1 Pages: 93-103
- DOI
  10.1007/s40505-013-0001-9
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-24730174, KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780139
[Presentation] Iterated dominance implementation of social choice correspondences under incomplete information2019
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  III Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K17087
[Presentation] Iterated weak dominance implementation under incomplete information2019
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  2019 Conference on Economic Design Programme
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K17087
[Presentation] Nash implementation with honesty and ranges of honesty2018
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  The 14th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K17087
[Presentation] Strategy-proofness and double implementation with maximin and maximax strategies2016
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Aadachi
- Organizer
  5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
- Place of Presentation
  Maastricht, Netherland
- Year and Date
  2016-07-26
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K17087
[Presentation] Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems2013
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  2013 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society
- Place of Presentation
  Singapore
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780139
[Presentation] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2012
- Author(s)
  Adachi, T.
- Organizer
  the 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
- Place of Presentation
  Istanbul, Turkey.
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2012
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  The 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
- Place of Presentation
  Istanbul (Turkey)
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] Natural implementation in scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011
- Author(s)
  Adachi, T.
- Organizer
  日本経済学会2011年度秋季大会
- Place of Presentation
  筑波
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011
- Author(s)
  Adachi, T.
- Organizer
  UECE Lisbon Meetings 2011 : Game Theory and Applications
- Place of Presentation
  Lisbon, Portugal.
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favoritesand Applications2011
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  UECE Lisbon Meetings 2011 : Game Theory and Applications
- Place of Presentation
  Lisbon (Portugal)
- Year and Date
  2011-11-05
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011
- Author(s)
  Adachi, T.
- Organizer
  International conference on "Applications of game theory in policies and decisions" in honor of Prof. C.R.Rao.
- Place of Presentation
  Hyderabad, India.
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] Natural implementation in scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  日本経済学会2011年度秋季大会
- Place of Presentation
  筑波大学(茨城県)
- Year and Date
  2011-10-30
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087
[Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011
- Author(s)
  Tsuyoshi Adachi
- Organizer
  International conference on "Applications of game theory in policies and decisions" in honor of Prof.C.R.Rao
- Place of Presentation
  Hyderabad (India)
- Year and Date
  2011-12-13
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23830087

1. 栗原崇 (40844543)

# of Collaborated Projects: 1 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results
2. KONGO Takumi

# of Collaborated Projects: 0 results

# of Collaborated Products: 2 results

ADACHI Tsuyoshi 安達 剛

Research Projects

Research Products

Co-Researchers

熟議デモクラシーを有効に機能させるための投票ルールの解明Principal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

Secure implementation with extensive form mechanismPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

Axiomatization of auction rules with non-bossinessPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

The effecitiveness of the unanimity rule with sequential voting when jurors are unfair.Principal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

[Journal Article] Further axiomatizations of Egghe's g-index2015

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Extended anonymity and Paretian relations on infinite utility streams2014

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2014

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems2014

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] First-price auctions on general preferenrce domains: axiomatic characterizations2013

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Presentation] Iterated dominance implementation of social choice correspondences under incomplete information2019

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] Iterated weak dominance implementation under incomplete information2019

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] Nash implementation with honesty and ranges of honesty2018

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] Strategy-proofness and double implementation with maximin and maximax strategies2016

Author(s)

Organizer

Place of Presentation

Year and Date

Data Source

[Presentation] Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems2013

Author(s)

Organizer

Place of Presentation

Data Source

[Presentation] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2012

Author(s)

Organizer

Place of Presentation

ADACHI Tsuyoshi 安達剛