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Yamazaki Takeshi  山崎 剛志

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YAMAZAKI Takeshi  山崎 剛志

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Researcher Number 50319141
Other IDs
Affiliation (Current) 2025: 新潟大学, 人文社会科学系, 教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help 2013 – 2016: 新潟大学, 人文社会・教育科学系, 教授
2012: 新潟大学, 人文社会・教育科学系, 准教授
2007 – 2010: Niigata University, 人文社会・教育科学系, 准教授
Review Section/Research Field
Principal Investigator
Economic theory
Keywords
Principal Investigator
レント・シーキング / パテント・レース / ナッシュ均衡 / 集約ゲーム / 一意性 / 存在 / レース / コンテスト / 均衡 / 動学的 / 内生的関税率
  • Research Projects

    (2 results)
  • Research Products

    (29 results)
  • Co-Researchers

    (1 People)
  •  Theory and Applications of Dynamic Rent SeekingPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      Yamazaki Takeshi
    • Project Period (FY)
      2012 – 2016
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Niigata University
  •  Rent Seeking and Endogenous Tariff RatePrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      YAMAZAKI Takeshi
    • Project Period (FY)
      2007 – 2010
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Niigata University

All 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2010 2009 2008 2007 Other

All Journal Article Presentation Book

  • [Book] Aggregative Games, Lobbying Models, and Endogenous Tariffs2013

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Total Pages
      200
    • Publisher
      Niigata University
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] Heterogeneity and number of players in rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games2016

    • Author(s)
      Noriaki Matsushima, Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi

      Volume: - Pages: 281-294

    • DOI

      10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_17

    • ISBN
      9783319292533, 9783319292540
    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests2016

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games: Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi

      Volume: なし Pages: 269-279

    • DOI

      10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_16

    • ISBN
      9783319292533, 9783319292540
    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Equilibrium Uniqueness in Aggregative Games2015

    • Author(s)
      Pierre von Mouche, Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Nonlinear and Convex Analysis

      Volume: 16(2) Pages: 353-364

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] Global Stability of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games2014

    • Author(s)
      Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      International Game Theory Review

      Volume: 16(4) Issue: 04 Pages: 1-15

    • DOI

      10.1142/s0219198914500145

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] 10.On the Unique Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Smooth Asymmetric Contests2013

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      The Journal of Economics, Niigata University

      Volume: 95 Pages: 99-115

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] Group-Size Effects on the Endogenous Tariff2012

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      新潟大学経済論集

      Volume: 93 Pages: 53-73

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Journal Article] On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players -A Cumulative-Best-Reply Approach-2010

    • Author(s)
      山崎剛志
    • Journal Title

      新潟大学経済論集 88

      Pages: 51-66

    • NAID

      120006741660

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players-A Cumulative-Best-Reply Approach-2010

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      新潟大学経済論集 Vol.88

      Pages: 51-66

    • NAID

      120006741660

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] The Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players2009

    • Author(s)
      山崎剛志
    • Journal Title

      Public Choice 139

      Pages: 335-342

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] The Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games with Risk-Averse Players2009

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      Public Choice Vol.139, No.3

      Pages: 335-342

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests2008

    • Author(s)
      山崎 剛志
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Public Economic Theory 10

      Pages: 317-327

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] Global Stability of Unique Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Rent-Seeking Game2008

    • Author(s)
      Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control Vol.32, No.4

      Pages: 1204-1211

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent-Seeking Contests2008

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Public Economic Theory Vol.10, No.2

      Pages: 317-327

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Journal Article] Global Stability of Unique Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Rent-Seeking Game2008

    • Author(s)
      奥口 孝二, 山崎 剛志
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 32

      Pages: 1204-1211

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Public-Good Contests with Player Identification2015

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      42nd Conference of the EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics)
    • Place of Presentation
      Munich, Germany
    • Year and Date
      2015-08-28
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Presentation] Group-Size Effects in Asymmetric Public-Good Contests2015

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      PET15 (2015 Conference of the Association for Public Economic Theory)
    • Place of Presentation
      Luxembourg, Luxembourg
    • Year and Date
      2015-07-02
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Presentation] Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games2010

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      11th conference of APET, Association for Public Economic(coauthored with Noriaki Matsushima)
    • Place of Presentation
      Theory, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Year and Date
      2010-06-27
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games2010

    • Author(s)
      山崎剛志
    • Organizer
      11th conference of APET(Association for Public Economic Theory)
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul,Turkey(トルコ)
    • Year and Date
      2010-06-27
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Global Stability of Nash Equilibrium under Generalized Hahn Conditions2009

    • Author(s)
      Koji Okuguchi, Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      36th Conference of the EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics), European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
    • Place of Presentation
      Ljubljana, Slovenia
    • Year and Date
      2009-09-04
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Global Stability of Nash Equilibrium under Generalized Hahn Conditions2009

    • Author(s)
      山崎剛志
    • Organizer
      36^<th> conference of EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics)
    • Place of Presentation
      Ljubljana, Slovenia
    • Year and Date
      2009-09-04
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Global Stability of Nash Equilibrium under Generalized Hahn Conditions2009

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      36th Conference of the EARIE, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics(coauthored with Koji Okuguchi)
    • Place of Presentation
      Ljubljana, Slovenia
    • Year and Date
      2009-09-04
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Group-Size Effects on Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Contest Model2008

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      35th Conference of the EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics), European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
    • Place of Presentation
      Toulouse, France
    • Year and Date
      2008-09-06
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Group-Size Effects on Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Contest Model2008

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      35th Conference of the EARIE, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
    • Place of Presentation
      Toulouse, France
    • Year and Date
      2008-09-06
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Group-Size Effects on Endogenous Tariff in a Lobbying Contest Model2008

    • Author(s)
      山崎 剛志
    • Organizer
      35^<th> conference of EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics)
    • Place of Presentation
      Toulouse, France
    • Year and Date
      2008-09-06
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Global stability of unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly and rent-seeking game (coauthored with K. Okuguchi)2007

    • Author(s)
      山崎 剛志
    • Organizer
      34th conference of the Earie (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics)
    • Place of Presentation
      Valencia, Spain
    • Year and Date
      2007-09-08
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Global Stability of Unique Nash Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Rent-Seeking Game2007

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      34th Conference of the EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics), European Association for Research in Industrial Economics
    • Place of Presentation
      Valencia, Spain
    • Year and Date
      2007-09-08
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530151
  • [Presentation] Asymmetry Between Two Players in a Simple Model of a Race with Uncertainty

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      50th Anniversary Conference of the Public Choice Society
    • Place of Presentation
      New Orleans, USA
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • [Presentation] Asymmetry between Two Players in a Dynamic Race

    • Author(s)
      Takeshi Yamazaki
    • Organizer
      PET13 (2013 Conference of the Association for Public Economic Theory)
    • Place of Presentation
      Lisbon, Portugal
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-24530194
  • 1.  松島 法明
    # of Collaborated Projects: 0 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 1 results

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