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sato shin  佐藤 伸

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SATO Shin  佐藤 伸

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Researcher Number 60458924
Other IDs
Affiliation (Current) 2025: 福岡大学, 経済学部, 教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help 2017 – 2019: 福岡大学, 経済学部, 教授
2013 – 2016: 福岡大学, 経済学部, 准教授
2010 – 2011: 福岡大学, 経済学部, 講師
Review Section/Research Field
Principal Investigator
Economic theory
Keywords
Principal Investigator
耐戦略性 / 社会的選択 / ミクロ経済学 / 社会的選択理論 / 虚偽申告 / 限定反応性 / 無関連対象からの独立性 / 社会的選択関数 / 社会的厚生関数 / 情報量 / 耐隣接操作性
  • Research Projects

    (3 results)
  • Research Products

    (17 results)
  • Co-Researchers

    (2 People)
  •  Possibility of new formulations of the robustness to misrepresentation for social choice rulesPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      Sato Shin
    • Project Period (FY)
      2016 – 2019
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Fukuoka University
  •  Nonmanipulability and informational bases of social choice rulesPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      SATO Shin
    • Project Period (FY)
      2013 – 2015
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Fukuoka University
  •  On possibility of constructing social choice functions which are nonmanipulable by preferences adjacent to the sincere onesPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      SATO Shin
    • Project Period (FY)
      2010 – 2011
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Fukuoka University

All 2017 2016 2015 2014 2011 2010

All Journal Article Presentation

  • [Journal Article] Evaluationwise strategy-proofness2017

    • Author(s)
      Erdamar Bora、Sanver M. Remzi、Sato Shin
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: 106 Pages: 227-238

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.010

    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K03571
  • [Journal Article] An impossibility under bounded response of social choice functions2017

    • Author(s)
      Muto Nozomu、Sato Shin
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: 106 Pages: 1-15

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.013

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K03571
  • [Journal Article] Bounded response of aggregated preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Nozomu Muto and Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Mathematical Economics

      Volume: 未定 Pages: 1-15

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.04.006

    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142
  • [Journal Article] A decomposition of strategy-proofness2016

    • Author(s)
      Nozomu Muto and Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 未定 Issue: 2 Pages: 1-18

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y

    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142, KAKENHI-PROJECT-26780116
  • [Journal Article] "Informational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff2016

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Mathematical Social Sciences

      Volume: 79 Pages: 11-19

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.10.003

    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142
  • [Journal Article] Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives2015

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 44 Issue: 1 Pages: 133-149

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-014-0825-8

    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142
  • [Journal Article] A fundamental structure of strategy-proof social choice correspondences with restricted preferences over alternatives2014

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 42 Issue: 4 Pages: 831-851

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-013-0755-x

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and the reluctance to make large lies : The case of weak orders2011

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 40 Issue: 2 Pages: 479-494

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-011-0616-4

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • [Presentation] An Impossibility under Bounded Response of Social Choice Functions2016

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      SMU Workshop on Mechanism Design 2016
    • Place of Presentation
      Singapore Management University
    • Year and Date
      2016-12-14
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K03571
  • [Presentation] A decomposition of strategy-proofness2015

    • Author(s)
      佐藤 伸
    • Organizer
      YNU Economics Workshop 2015
    • Place of Presentation
      横浜国立大学
    • Year and Date
      2015-03-04
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142
  • [Presentation] A decomposition of strategy-proofness2014

    • Author(s)
      佐藤 伸
    • Organizer
      第20回DCコンファレンス
    • Place of Presentation
      福岡大学
    • Year and Date
      2014-10-13
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25780142
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2011

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      7th Biannual Conference on Economic Design
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Montreal,カナダ
    • Year and Date
      2011-06-15
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2011

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Organizer
      The 7th Biannual Conference on Economic Design, University of Montreal
    • Place of Presentation
      カナダ
    • Year and Date
      2011-06-15
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2010

    • Author(s)
      Shin Sato
    • Organizer
      Hitotsubashi G-COE Lectures and Workshop on Choice
    • Place of Presentation
      一橋大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-10-23
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • [Presentation] Adjacent manipulation2010

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会
    • Place of Presentation
      千葉大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-06-06
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • [Presentation] Adjacent manipulation2010

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会2010年度春季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      千葉大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-06-06
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • [Presentation] A Sufficient Condition for the Equivalence of Strategy-Proofness and Nonmanipulability by Preferences Adjacent to the Sincere One2010

    • Author(s)
      佐藤伸
    • Organizer
      Hitotsubashi G-COE Lectures and Workshop on Choice, Games, and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      一橋大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-10-23
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730167
  • 1.  Erdamar Bora
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 2.  Sanver Remzi
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results

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