KAWAMORI Tomohiko 川森智彦

Researcher Number	70550531
Affiliation (Current)	2025: 名城大学, 経済学部, 教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help	2018 – 2024: 名城大学, 経済学部, 教授 2015 – 2017: 名城大学, 経済学部, 准教授 2012 – 2014: 大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 准教授 2009 – 2011: Osaka University of Economics, 経済学部, 講師
Review Section/Research Field	Principal Investigator Economic theory / Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
Keywords	Principal Investigator ゲーム理論 / 交渉理論 / 交渉 / 提携形成 / 戦略 / 連続時間ゲーム / 努力の最大化 / rent dissipation / contest success function / 外部機会 … More / コンテスト / 繰り返し交渉 / 内生的交渉決裂点 / 時間選好 / 提携交渉 / 割引因子 / 不完全な履行 Less

Research Projects
(5 results)
Research Products
(11 results)

Restriction of Strategies in Continuous-Time GamesPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  川森智彦
- Project Period (FY)
  2024 – 2028
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Meijo University
Study on Contests with Outside OpportunitiesPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Project Period (FY)
  2019 – 2023
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Meijo University
Repeated Bargaining with Endogenous Disagreement PointsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Kawamori Tomohiko
- Project Period (FY)
  2015 – 2018
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Meijo University
Study on Coalitional Bargaining with Imperfect Implementation of AgreementsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  KAWAMORI Tomohiko
- Project Period (FY)
  2011 – 2014
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
Study on the role of protocols in legislative bargaining : Noncooperative game approachPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  KAWAMORI Tomohiko
- Project Period (FY)
  2009 – 2010
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics

All 2023 2022 2018 2017 2016 2014 2013 2009

All Journal Article Presentation

[Journal Article] Complete rent dissipation in contest with power technologies2023
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Operations Research Letters
  
  Volume: 51 Issue: 4 Pages: 453-455
- DOI
  10.1016/j.orl.2023.06.009
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K01563
[Journal Article] Complete-rent-dissipation contest design2023
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Economics Letters
  
  Volume: 232 Pages: 111346-111346
- DOI
  10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111346
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K01563
[Journal Article] Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining2022
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Journal of Mathematical Economics
  
  Volume: 99 Pages: 102582-102582
- DOI
  10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102582
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23730201
[Journal Article] Partially cooperative games2018
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Mathematical Social Sciences
  
  Volume: 93 Pages: 90-100
- DOI
  10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.03.001
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15K17028
[Journal Article] Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations2017
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori and Toshiji Miyakawa
- Journal Title
  
  Operations Research Letters
  
  Volume: 45 Issue: 5 Pages: 427-430
- DOI
  10.1016/j.orl.2017.06.007
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15K17028
[Journal Article] Nash bargaining solution under externalities2016
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori and Toshiji Miyakawa
- Journal Title
  
  Mathematical Social Sciences
  
  Volume: 84 Pages: 1-7
- DOI
  10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.001
- Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15K17028
[Journal Article] Hart-Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value2016
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Theory and Decision
  
  Volume: 81 Issue: 3 Pages: 357-369
- DOI
  10.1007/s11238-016-9536-1
- Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15K17028
[Journal Article] A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution2014
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Journal of Mathematical Economics
  
  Volume: 52 Pages: 12-15
- DOI
  10.1016/j.jmateco.2014.03.004
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23730201
[Journal Article] Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences2013
- Author(s)
  Tomohiko Kawamori
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: 40 Issue: 1 Pages: 27-40
- DOI
  10.1007/s00355-011-0567-9
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21830145
[Presentation] Rejecter-propose legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time preferences2009
- Author(s)
  川森智彦
- Organizer
  制度論研究会
- Place of Presentation
  大阪経済大学
- Year and Date
  2009-11-07
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21830145
[Presentation] Rejecter-propose legislative bargaining with heterogeneous discount factors2009
- Author(s)
  川森智彦
- Organizer
  関西ゲーム理論研究会
- Place of Presentation
  甲南大学
- Year and Date
  2009-06-27
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21830145

KAWAMORI Tomohiko 川森 智彦

Research Projects

Research Products

Restriction of Strategies in Continuous-Time GamesPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

Study on Contests with Outside OpportunitiesPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

Repeated Bargaining with Endogenous Disagreement PointsPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

Study on Coalitional Bargaining with Imperfect Implementation of AgreementsPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

Study on the role of protocols in legislative bargaining : Noncooperative game approachPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

[Journal Article] Complete rent dissipation in contest with power technologies2023

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Complete-rent-dissipation contest design2023

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining2022

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Partially cooperative games2018

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Equivalent conditions for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations2017

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Nash bargaining solution under externalities2016

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Hart-Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value2016

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution2014

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences2013

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Presentation] Rejecter-propose legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time preferences2009

Author(s)

KAWAMORI Tomohiko 川森智彦