Serizawa Shigehiro 芹澤成弘

… Alternative Names

SERIZAWA Shigehiro 芹澤成弘

芹澤茂弘セリザワシゲヒロ

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Researcher Number	90252717
Other IDs
External Links
Affiliation (Current)	2025: 大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 教授 2025: 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 招へい教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help	2023 – 2024: 大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 教授 2022 – 2024: 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 招へい教授 2004 – 2022: 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授 1999 – 2003: 東北大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 助教授 1997 – 1998: 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 助教授 1994 – 1996: 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 講師
Review Section/Research Field	Principal Investigator Economic theory / 経済理論 / Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields / Economic statistics Except Principal Investigator Economic theory / 経済理論 / Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related / Broad Section A / Public finance/Monetary economics / Economic statistics / Humanities and Social Sciences
Keywords	Principal Investigator Strategy-Proofness / Social Choice Function / 耐戦略性 / Pareto-Efficiency / 統計調査 / オークション / 経済実験 / Game Theory / 引用数 / 研究評価 … More / 学術誌 / Article Influence Score / インパクト・ファクター / Uniform Rule / メカニズム・デザイン / Symmetry / Social Choice / Public Good / Voting / Incentive Compatibility / マーケット・デザイン / マーケットデザイン / Vickrey Allocation Rule / Anonymity / 非分割財 / Pure Exchange Economy / Allotoment Economy / Free Rider / Social Choice Theory / 対戦略性 / マッチング / Article Influence score / Academic journal / Citation / Research Productivity / インパクトファクター / 被引用回数 / 査読付き学術誌 / 研究生産性 / Secure Implementability / トップ・トレーディング・サイクル・メカニズム / トップ・トレーディング / 腎臓交換メカニズム / 最大定義域 / Bribe-proofness / 戦略的虚偽表明の防止 / インセンティブ / 経済学 / 研究業績 / 誘因両立性 / Respect for Pairwise Unanimity / Matching / Multidimensional Sigle-Peakedness / Non-bossiness / Same Sideness / Respect for Unanimity / 意思決定手続き / 社会選択論 / Minimal consumption Condition / Mechanism Design / Symmtery / Individual Rationality / Strategy-Prodness / Preferonce Domain … More Except Principal Investigator 経済実験 / メカニズム・デザイン / 制度設計 / 資産選好 / アンケート調査 / マクロ経済学 / 制度設計理論 / 行動経済学 / 長期不況 / オークション / 公共財供給 / メカニズムデザイン / オークション理論 / 法と経済学 / アルゴリズム設計 / マッチング / 格差拡大 / 組織の経済学 / 貨幣選好 / 地位選好 / 資産効果 / Emergence of Cooneration / Nuerneconomics / Public Good / Spiteful Behavior / Pivotal Mechanism / Nash / Secure Implementation / Engineering for Institutional Design / 排出権取引 / 支配戦略均衡 / 談合 / 繰り返しゲーム / 上流還元型排出権取引制度 / ポスト京都 / MPFC / 前島 / グローブス・メカニズム / ナッシュ均衡 / 支配戦略 / セキュア・メカニズム / スパイト・アバージョン / スパイト行動 / ブレイスパラドックス / 拘泥 / 協力の創発 / ニューロエコノミックス / 公共財 / いじわる / ピボタル・メカニズム / ナッシュ / セキュア遂行 / 制度設計工学 / CONSUMER SURPLUS / PARTIAL-EQUILIBRIUM MODEL / MULTI-ITEM AUCTION / 準線型選好 / ワルラス型競争均衡 / Vickrey型オークション / 消費者余剰 / 部分均衡モデル / 多数財オークション / Incentive / Knightian Uncertainty / Optimal BIS Banking Regulation / Environmental Problem / Global Warming / Indivisible Good / Non-Paternalistic Altruism / Mechanism Design / インセンティブ / ナイト流不確実性 / 自己資本比率 / 環境問題 / 地球温暖化 / 分割不可能財 / 非家父長的利他性 / 不法行為 / 社会規範 / 手抜き工事 / 法解釈学 / 法政策分析 / 不法行為法 / 二重の基準論 / 公共経済学 / 公共工事 / 厚生経済学 / ノンパラメトリック / アフィリエーション / 確率分布 / ノンパラメトリックモデル / 実験データ / リスク中立性 / 社会的ジレンマ / 実験社会科学 / ニューロサイエンス / 協力 / 信頼ゲーム / 最小努力ゲーム / 国際比較 / 実験 / 環境 / 社会関係資本 / 公共工事入札制度 / 公共工事入札 / 実験経済学 Less

マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装Principal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  2022 – 2026
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
- Review Section
  
  Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
  Osaka University
オークション理論のフロンティアと応用
- Principal Investigator
  
  孫寧
- Project Period (FY)
  2021 – 2025
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
  Osaka University
International Joint Research on Market DesignPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  2020 – 2024
- Research Category
  
  Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (Fostering Joint International Research (B))
- Review Section
  
  Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
  Osaka University
Economic stagnation and widening wealth inequality: Crises of the world economy and a construction of a unified macroeconomic theory
- Principal Investigator
  
  小野善康
- Project Period (FY)
  2020 – 2024
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S)
- Review Section
  
  Broad Section A
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
International Comparison of Research Productivity of EconomicsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Serizawa Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2019 – 2022
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Research (Exploratory)
- Review Section
  
  Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Study of Evaluating Research Productivity of Japanese Universities: Case of EconomicsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Serizawa Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2016 – 2018
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Behavioral-Economic Analysis of Long-Run Stagnation
- Principal Investigator
  
  Ono Yoshiyasu
- Project Period (FY)
  2015 – 2019
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Allocation rules of indivisible goods and their applicationsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Serizawa Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2015 – 2019
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
The Evaluation Indies of Academic Journals and the Productivity of Economics Research in JapanPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Serizawa Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2013 – 2015
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Theories, experiments, and applications of mechanism designPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  SERIZAWA SHIGEHIRO
- Project Period (FY)
  2010 – 2014
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
The Productivity Analysis of Economics Research in JapanPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  SERIZAWA Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2010 – 2012
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
- Research Field
  
  Economic statistics
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Law and Economics, and Mechanism Design
- Principal Investigator
  
  TSUNEKI Atsushi
- Project Period (FY)
  2009 – 2011
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Research Field
  
  Public finance/Monetary economics
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Role of Social Capital and its Construction
- Principal Investigator
  
  SHIMIZU Kazumi, YAMATO Takehiko
- Project Period (FY)
  2007 – 2012
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas
- Review Section
  
  Humanities and Social Sciences
- Research Institution
  Waseda University
  Tokyo Institute of Technology
オークション理論における統計的推測と実証分析
- Principal Investigator
  
  大屋幸輔
- Project Period (FY)
  2007 – 2008
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Exploratory Research
- Research Field
  
  Economic statistics
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Strategy-Proof Social Choice Rules in the International SocietyPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  SERIZAWA Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2006 – 2008
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Law and Economics and Mechanism Design
- Principal Investigator
  
  TSUNEKI Atsushi
- Project Period (FY)
  2005 – 2008
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Engineering for Institutional Design : Building up a new field
- Principal Investigator
  
  SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
- Project Period (FY)
  2004 – 2007
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
Strategy-proof rules in the international SocietyPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  SERIZAWA Shigehiro
- Project Period (FY)
  2003 – 2005
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Osaka University
  Tohoku University
RESEARCH ON MULTI-ITEM AUCTIONS
- Principal Investigator
  
  MIYAKE Mitsunobu
- Project Period (FY)
  2002 – 2005
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  TOHOKU UNIVERSITY
国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  2001 – 2002
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Tohoku University
Mechanism Design Theory and its Application to various Models
- Principal Investigator
  
  HORI Hajime
- Project Period (FY)
  2000 – 2002
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Tohoku University
国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止す社会的意志決定手続きPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  1999 – 2000
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Tohoku University
国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  1997 – 1998
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Shiga University
国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  1996
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Shiga University
国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  1995
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Shiga University
国際社会において、戦略的行動を抑止する意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  1994
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
- Research Field
  
  経済理論
- Research Institution
  Shiga University

[Journal Article] Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples2023
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Games and Economic Behavior
  
  Volume: 140 Pages: 210-228
- DOI
  10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011
- NAID
  40022515556
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22K13364, KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062, KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653, KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Journal Article] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects2022
- Author(s)
  Yuya Wakabayashi,Ryosuke Sakai,Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1161
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects2022
- Author(s)
  Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1161
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Journal Article] The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction2022
- Author(s)
  Takehito Masuda, Ryo Mikami, Toyotaka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, and Takuma Wakayama
- Journal Title
  
  Experimental Economics
  
  Volume: ー Issue: 3 Pages: 902-941
- DOI
  10.1007/s10683-021-09736-5
- NAID
  40022512466
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-17K13701, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20K13450, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20K01555, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027, KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Journal Article] A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects2021
- Author(s)
  Ryosuke Sakai,Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University
  
  Volume: 1134
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2021
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa,Takehito Masuda,Toyotaka Sakai,Takuma Wakayama
- Journal Title
  
  Experimental Economics
  
  Volume: Forthcoming
- NAID
  40022512466
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] A Characterization of the Vickery Rule in Slot Allocation Problems2021
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1120
- Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects2021
- Author(s)
  Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: - Issue: 1-2 Pages: 103-120
- DOI
  10.1007/s00355-021-01333-y
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19J10221, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631, KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（2020年）2021
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘、柴田章久、高橋悟
- Journal Title
  
  Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research
  
  Volume: 1129 Pages: 1-9
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K21695
[Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（2020年）2021
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘, 柴田章久, 高橋悟
- Journal Title
  
  ISER　Discussion Paper No. 1129
  
  Volume: ー Pages: 1-9
- Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K21695
[Journal Article] A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects2021
- Author(s)
  Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1134
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Journal Article] A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems2021
- Author(s)
  Zhou Yu、Chun Youngsub、Serizawa Shigehiro
- Journal Title
  
  International Journal of Economic Theory
  
  Volume: 18 Issue: 1 Pages: 38-49
- DOI
  10.1111/ijet.12306
- NAID
  120007191383
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631, KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Journal Article] Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2021
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1116
- NAID
  40022515556
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系４附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部、香港大学経営経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（2019年）2020
- Author(s)
  Koichi Futagami, Kazuya Kamiya, Shigehiro Serizawa, Akihisa Shibata and Satoru Takahashi
- Journal Title
  
  ISER　Discussion Paper No. 1086
  
  Volume: - Pages: 1-8
- NAID
  40022347491
- Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K21695
[Journal Article] On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy2020
- Author(s)
  Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Masso, and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1112
- NAID
  40022512509
- Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2020
- Author(s)
  Masuda Takehito, Mikami Ryo, Sakai Toyotaka, Serizawa Shigehiro, Wakayama Takuma
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1109
- NAID
  40022512466
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Journal Article] Mechanism design without quasilinearity2020
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya、Mishra Debasis、Serizawa Shigehiro
- Journal Title
  
  Theoretical Economics
  
  Volume: 15 Issue: 2 Pages: 511-544
- DOI
  10.3982/te2910
- NAID
  40022346995
- Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2020
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya、Mishra Debasis、Serizawa Shigehiro
- Journal Title
  
  Journal of Economic Theory
  
  Volume: 188 Pages: 105036-105036
- DOI
  10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036
- NAID
  40022346990
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] Mechanism Design without Quasilinearity2020
- Author(s)
  Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Theoretical Economics
  
  Volume: 15 Pages: 511-544
- NAID
  40022346995
- Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Journal Article] A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2019
- Author(s)
  Takehito Masuda, Toyataka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, and Takuma Wakayama
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper, Osaka University
  
  Volume: 1048 Pages: 1-22
- NAID
  40022347266
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] The Role of Characterizations in Market Design2019
- Author(s)
  James Schummer and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  The Future of Economic Design
  
  Volume: 2019.11 Pages: 201-211
- DOI
  10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_28
- ISBN
  9783030180492, 9783030180508
- Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper, Osaka University
  
  Volume: 1047 Pages: 1-53
- NAID
  40022347261
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] A Strategy-Proof Mechanism should be Announced to be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2019
- Author(s)
  Takehito Masuda, Toyotaka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa and Takuma Wakayama
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 2019.11, No.1048
- NAID
  40022347266
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系５附置研究所及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部の研究生産性比較調査（2018 年）2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Journal Title
  
  2018年大阪大学社会経済研究所活動報告
  
  Volume: - Pages: 18-24
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K13352
[Journal Article] A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2018
- Author(s)
  Takehito Masuda, Toyataka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, and Takuma Wakayama
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1048
- NAID
  40022347266
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear and Common-Tiered-Object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule2018
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Games and Economic Behavior
  
  Volume: - Pages: 327-363
- DOI
  10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019
- NAID
  40022346745
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
[Journal Article] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2018
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 1047
- NAID
  40022347261
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Journal Article] 9大学経済学研究科・附置研究所の研究生産性比較調査（2016年）2017
- Author(s)
  Koichi Futagami, Kazuya Kamiya, Shigehiro Serizawa and Akihisa Shibata
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 2017.4, No.998 Pages: 1-11
- NAID
  40022347041
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K13352
[Journal Article] Mechanism Design without Quasilinearity2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa, Tomoya Kazumura and Debasis Mishra
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: No.1005 Pages: 1-60
- NAID
  40022346995
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] 9大学経済学研究科・附置研究所の研究生産性比較調査（2016年）2017
- Author(s)
  二神孝一、神谷和也、芹澤成弘、柴田章久
- Journal Title
  
  大阪大学社会経済研究所、Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 998 Pages: 1-9
- NAID
  40022347041
- Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K13352
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Auction Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Tomoya Kazumura, *Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper,
  
  Volume: 1001 Pages: 1-40
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Auction Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa, Tomoya Kazumura and Debasis Mishra
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: No.1001 Pages: 1-41
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi-demand Preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: 47(3) Issue: 3 Pages: 633-663
- DOI
  10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8
- NAID
  40022346582
- Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-14J05972
[Journal Article] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015
- Author(s)
  Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Discussion Paper, ISER, No 943
  
  Volume: 943 Pages: 1-25
- NAID
  40022346582
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Non-quasi-linear Preferences: a Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2015
- Author(s)
  Shuhei Morimoto and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Theoretical Economics
  
  Volume: 10(2) Issue: 2 Pages: 445-487
- DOI
  10.3982/te1470
- Peer Reviewed / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-13J02188
[Journal Article] 5大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査（2014年）2015
- Author(s)
  二神孝一　神谷和也　芹澤成弘　柴田章久
- Journal Title
  
  経済セミナー
  
  Volume: 684号 Pages: 71-77
- NAID
  40022346483
- Acknowledgement Compliant
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-25590045
[Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Non-quasi-linear Preferences: a Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2015
- Author(s)
  Shuhei Morimotoy, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Theoretical Economics
  
  Volume: 印刷中
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Journal Article] Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment: Impossibility Theorems2015
- Author(s)
  Hikaru Kondo and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER DP
  
  Volume: 927 Pages: 1-12
- NAID
  40022346442
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Journal Article] 5大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査（2014年）2015
- Author(s)
  二神孝一、神谷和也、芹澤成弘、柴田章久
- Journal Title
  
  大阪大学社会経済研究所、Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 934 Pages: 1-7
- NAID
  40022346483
- Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-25590045
[Journal Article] A Maximal Domain for Stragegy-proof and No-vetoer Rules in the Multi-object Choice Model2014
- Author(s)
  Kantaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  International Journal of Game Theory
  
  Volume: 43 Issue: 1 Pages: 153-168
- DOI
  10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061, KAKENHI-PROJECT-24830109
[Journal Article] A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Goods and Agents2013
- Author(s)
  Shuhei Morimoto , Stephen Ching and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: 40 Issue: 3 Pages: 871-911
- DOI
  10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2012
- Author(s)
  S. Morimoto and S. Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 852 Pages: 1-47
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Journal Article] Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rule by Anonymity2012
- Author(s)
  I.Ashlagi, S.Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: 38 Issue: 3 Pages: 531-542
- DOI
  10.1007/s00355-011-0535-4
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300, KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Journal Article] The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions inJapan; Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output2011
- Author(s)
  S.Serizawa, K.Futagami, K.Kamiya, S.Ohta, Y.Sawada, A.Shibata
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: No.802
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22653028
[Journal Article] The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions in Japan; Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output2011
- Author(s)
  S.Serizawa, K.Futagami, K.Kamiya, S.Ohta, Y.Sawada, A.Shibata
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: No.802
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22653028
[Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010
- Author(s)
  Shohei Takagi and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Pages: 245-266
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] An Impossibility Theorem for Matching Problems2010
- Author(s)
  S.Serizawa, S.Takagi
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: 35 Pages: 245-266
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Journal Article] An Impossibility Theorem for Matching Problems2010
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa and S. Takagi
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: Vol.35, No.2 Pages: 245-266
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010
- Author(s)
  Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming)
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010
- Author(s)
  Shohei Takagi1, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010
- Author(s)
  Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: 35 Pages: 245-266
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling : Theoretical and Experimental Results2009
- Author(s)
  Robert F.Veszteg, Kenju Akai, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Osaka University, ISER Discussion Paper 747
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Journal Article] Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods2009
- Author(s)
  Kentaro Hatsumi and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: Volume 33 Pages: 423-447
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices2009
- Author(s)
  K. Akai, T. Saijo and S. Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  SER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 743
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Journal Article] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting, Osaka University2009
- Author(s)
  Kenju Akai, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research, Discussion No.740
  
  Pages: 18-18
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530143
[Journal Article] Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods2009
- Author(s)
  Kentaro Hatsumi, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare Volume33,Number3
  
  Pages: 423-447
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices2009
- Author(s)
  Kenju Akai, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Osaka University, ISER Discussion Paper 743
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Journal Article] Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods2009
- Author(s)
  Kentaro Hatsumi, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare 33
  
  Pages: 423-447
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods2009
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa, K. Hatsumi
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
  
  Volume: Vol.33, No.3 Pages: 423-447
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Journal Article] Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling : Theoretical and Experimental Results2009
- Author(s)
  R F. Veszteg, K. Akai, T. Saijo and S. Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion Paper
  
  Volume: 747
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Journal Article] Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect2008
- Author(s)
  Hiroki Saitoh, and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Economic Theory Vol.35, No.2
  
  Pages: 391-401
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Journal Article] Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect2008
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa, and Hiroki Saitoh
- Journal Title
  
  Economic Theory Vol.35, No.2
  
  Pages: 391-401
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530143
[Journal Article] COALITIONALLY STRATEGY-ROOF RULES IN ALLOTMENT ECONOMIES OF HOMOGENEOUS INDIVISIBLE GOODS2008
- Author(s)
  Hatsumi, K. and Serizawa, S
- Journal Title
  
  Social choice and Welfare (online first)
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Journal Article] Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction2007
- Author(s)
  Soo Hong, Chew, and Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Journal Title
  
  Economic Theory Vol.33, No.2
  
  Pages: 393-406
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006
- Author(s)
  Mizobuchi, H., Serizawa, S
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare Vol.27, No.1
  
  Pages: 195-210
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey allocation Rule2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper No.648 March
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
[Journal Article] Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation2006
- Author(s)
  Serizawa, Shigehiro
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare Vol.26, No.2
  
  Pages: 305-331
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006
- Author(s)
  Mizobuchi, M., Serizawa S.
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming)
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
[Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006
- Author(s)
  Mizobuchi, Hideyuki, and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare Vol.27, No.1
  
  Pages: 195-210
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Journal Article] "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation"2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare (掲載予定)
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
[Journal Article] "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation"2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare 26
  
  Pages: 305-331
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper, March
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
[Journal Article] An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems2006
- Author(s)
  Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper, December No.677
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Journal Article] Pairwise Strategy-Proofiaess and Self-Enforcing Manipulation2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro, Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule2006
- Author(s)
  Serizawa, S.
- Journal Title
  
  Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper No.648 March
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
[Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  No.648(Osaka University, Discussion Paper)
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006
- Author(s)
  Mizobuchi, H., Serizawa, S.
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare Vol.27, No 1
  
  Pages: 195-210
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
[Journal Article] Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction2005
- Author(s)
  Chew Soo Hong, 芹澤成弘
- Journal Title
  
  大阪大学社会経済研究所 Discussion paper No.631
  
  Pages: 1-11
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-14530001
[Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economy2005
- Author(s)
  Hideyuki Mizobuchi, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  Osaka University, ISER, Discussion Paper No.628(in press)
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
[Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies
- Author(s)
  Mizobuchi, M, Serizawa, S.
- Journal Title
  
  Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming)
- Description
  「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
[Presentation] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices2024
- Author(s)
  Yuya Wakabayashi with Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Microeconomic Seminar
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices2024
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Microeconomic Seminar Series, Adam Smith Bussiness School, University of Glasgow
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices2024
- Author(s)
  Yuya Wakabayashi with Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Microeconomic Seminar
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices2024
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Microeconomic Seminar Series, Adam Smith Bussiness School, University of Glasgow
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  ミクロ経済学ワークショップ（Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy）
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] A Characterization of the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price without quasilinearity2023
- Author(s)
  Debasis Mishra with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting (NASM)
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] A Characterization of the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price without quasilinearity2023
- Author(s)
  Debasis Mishra with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting (NASM)
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] For an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices2023
- Author(s)
  Yuya Wakabayashi with Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  3rd International PhD-Student Conference on Economics and Business, University of Malaga
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] For an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices2023
- Author(s)
  Yuya Wakabayashi with Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  3rd International PhD-Student Conference on Economics and Business, University of Malaga
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  ミクロ経済学ワークショップ（Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy）
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023
- Author(s)
  Yu Zhou with Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory -22nd annual SAET Conference
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023
- Author(s)
  Zhou Yu with Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory -22nd annual SAET Conference
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2022 Conference Australia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Workshop on Mechanism Design and Welfare Economics
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and South-East Asia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market: The Serial Vickrey Mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 INFORMS Annual Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Multi-object Auc- tion Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  12th Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  16th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Presentation] Factors causing non-sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 European ESA Meeting in Bologna
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Workshop on Mechanism Design and Welfare Economics
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Multi-object Auc- tion Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  12th Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2022 Conference Australia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  16th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and South-East Asia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and South-East Asia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Multi-object Auc- tion Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  12th Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  16th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Factors causing non-sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 European ESA Meeting in Bologna
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Workshop on Mechanism Design and Welfare Economics
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Factors causing non-sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 European ESA Meeting in Bologna
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market: The Serial Vickrey Mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 INFORMS Annual Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market: The Serial Vickrey Mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 INFORMS Annual Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Workshop on Mechanism Design and Welfare Economics
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society in East and South-East Asia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market: The Serial Vickrey Mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 INFORMS Annual Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631
[Presentation] Factors causing non-sincere bidding in the Vickrey auction2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 European ESA Meeting in Bologna
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  16th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Multi-object Auc- tion Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  12th Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2022 Conference Australia
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2022
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  Economic Seminar
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  2019 Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  The 19th Annual SAET Conference
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2019 NANJING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY & THE SIXTH MICROECONOMICS WORKSHOP
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2019
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Conference in Honor of John Weymark
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  2019 NANJING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY & THE SIXTH MICROECONOMICS WORKSHOP
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  The 19th Annual SAET Conference
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  Conference in Honor of John Weymark
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2019 Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR, Universidad Carlos III at Madrid, Madrid
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019
- Author(s)
  芹澤成弘
- Organizer
  III SPAIN-JAPAN MEETING ON ECONOMIC THEORY
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Market Design Seminar
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Market Design Seminar, Stanford University
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Mechanism Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with Non-Quasiliner Preferences2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  HSI2018 4th Hitotsubashi Summer Institute
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof MultiObject Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  International Conference on Public Economic Theory 2018, Hue University
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Mechanism Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with Non-Quasiliner Preferences2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  HSI2018--4th Hitotsubashi Summer Institute
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Workshop on Information and Incentives, University of Malaga
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with no Wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  The 3rd Glasgow workshop on Mechanism Design and Behavioural Economics
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2018
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Microeconomics seminar, Korea University
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2018, DC Davis
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design, Durham University Business School
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  The 14th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  International Conference on Public Economic Theory 2018
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof MultiObject Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018
- Author(s)
  芹澤　成弘
- Organizer
  International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications, 西南財経大学
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2017 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Lisbon
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey algorithms2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2017 European Meeting of the Econometric Society
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with Equal Treatment of Equals and No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for General Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithms2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  13th European Meeting on Game Theory, Paris
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with no Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory, Seville
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Nanjing International Conference on Game Theory and the Fourth Microeconomics Workshop, Nanjing
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2017 Nanjing International Conference on Game Theory & the Fourth Microeconomics Workshop
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  18th Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Paris
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey algorithms2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  13th European Meeting on Game Theory
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Microeconomic Seminar
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Multi-object auction design: revenue maximization with no wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  18th Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2017 Conference on Economic Design, York
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2017 Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (with Kazumura T.)2016
- Author(s)
  Serizawa S.
- Organizer
  Seminar
- Place of Presentation
  Singapore Management University, Singapore
- Year and Date
  2016-03-29
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  13th International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
- Place of Presentation
  Lund University, Lund, SWEDEN
- Year and Date
  2016-06-28
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  The 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Place of Presentation
  Lund University, Lund, SWEDEN
- Year and Date
  2016-06-28
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Equal Treatment of Equals and Strategy-proofness in Object Allocation with Non-quasi-linear Preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Advances in Mechanism Design
- Place of Presentation
  NYUAD Campus, Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi
- Year and Date
  2016-12-17
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-linear and Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule.2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  SMU WORKSHOP ON MECHANISM DESIGN
- Place of Presentation
  Singapore Management University, Singapore
- Year and Date
  2016-12-14
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasilinear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  III MOMA Group Meeting
- Place of Presentation
  Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
- Year and Date
  2016-09-23
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (with Kazumura T.)2016
- Author(s)
  Serizawa S.
- Organizer
  Seminar
- Place of Presentation
  Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, India
- Year and Date
  2016-03-10
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2016 European Meeting of the the Econometric Society
- Place of Presentation
  CICG Geneva, Geneva, Swiss
- Year and Date
  2016-08-22
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] When are strategyproof and efficient rules possible in objects allocation with money?2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  The GAMES 2016 congress
- Place of Presentation
  Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
- Year and Date
  2016-07-24
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  GAMES 2016 - Fifth World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 34
- Place of Presentation
  Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
- Year and Date
  2016-07-24
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] When are Strategy-proof and Efficient Rules Possible in Object Allocation with Money?2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  UC Barkley Microeconomic Theory Seminar
- Place of Presentation
  Department of Economics, UC Barkley, Berkeley, USA
- Year and Date
  2016-02-01
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-linear and Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule.2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  SMU WORKSHOP ON MECHANISM DESIGN
- Place of Presentation
  Singapore Management University, Singapore
- Year and Date
  2016-12-14
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (with Kazumura T.)2016
- Author(s)
  Serizawa S.
- Organizer
  II MOMA Meeting
- Place of Presentation
  Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain
- Year and Date
  2016-01-15
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasilinear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  III MOMA Group Meeting
- Place of Presentation
  Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
- Year and Date
  2016-09-23
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi-demand Preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Singapore Management University, School of Economics Seminar
- Place of Presentation
  School of Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore
- Year and Date
  2016-03-29
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Equal Treatment of Equals and Strategy-proofness in Object Allocation with Non-quasi-linear Preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Advances in Mechanism Design
- Place of Presentation
  NYUAD Campus, Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi
- Year and Date
  2016-12-17
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation With Money? (with Kazumura T.)2016
- Author(s)
  Serizawa S.
- Organizer
  Seminar
- Place of Presentation
  UC Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
- Year and Date
  2016-02-01
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  EEA-ESEM 2016
- Place of Presentation
  CICG Geneva, Geneva, Swiss
- Year and Date
  2016-08-22
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] When are strategy-proof and efficient rules possible in objects allocation with money?2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2016 Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society
- Place of Presentation
  Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
- Year and Date
  2016-08-11
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] When are strategy-proof and efficient rules possible in objects allocation with money?2016
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2016 Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society
- Place of Presentation
  Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
- Year and Date
  2016-08-11
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation With Money? (with Kazumura T.)2015
- Author(s)
  Serizawa S.
- Organizer
  The Conference on Economic Design
- Place of Presentation
  Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey
- Year and Date
  2015-07-01
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  上海財経大学経済学部セミナー
- Place of Presentation
  School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finace and Economics, Shanghai, China
- Year and Date
  2015-11-24
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2015 SSK International Conference on Distributive Justice
- Place of Presentation
  Hotel Ibis Seoul Myeong-Dong, Seoul, Korea
- Year and Date
  2015-10-08
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] When are Strategy‐proof and Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation with Money?2015
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  IDGP 2015 Workshop, "Institutions, Decisions and Governmental Practices:  Theory, Simulations and Applications"
- Place of Presentation
  Campus de Bellaterra-UAB, Barcelona, Spain
- Year and Date
  2015-06-02
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  南京大学経済学部セミナー
- Place of Presentation
  Department of Economics, Nanjin University, Nanjin, China
- Year and Date
  2015-11-20
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation With Money?2015
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Conference on Economic Deasign 2015
- Place of Presentation
  Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey
- Year and Date
  2015-07-01
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
[Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2014
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Academia Sinica-ISER workshop
- Place of Presentation
  Academia Sinica　Taiwan
- Year and Date
  2014-04-01
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences2014
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Market Design Workshop
- Place of Presentation
  Osaka University
- Year and Date
  2014-09-30
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2013
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Workshops　 University of Rochester
- Place of Presentation
  University of Rochester
- Year and Date
  2013-09-10
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2012
- Author(s)
  S. Morimoto and S. Serizawa
- Organizer
  第18回DCコンファレンス（TCERミクロコンファレンス）
- Place of Presentation
  関西大学千里山キャンパス
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] A Characterization of Simultaneous Ascending Rule: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences2012
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa
- Organizer
  PET12 TAIPEI
- Place of Presentation
  Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
- Invited
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] A Characterization of Simultaneous Ascending Rule: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences2012
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa
- Organizer
  Frontiers in Market Design: Matching Markets
- Place of Presentation
  Centro Stefano Franscini, Monte Verita, Ascona, Switzerland
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] A Characterization of Simultaneous Ascending Rule: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences2012
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa
- Organizer
  11th International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
- Place of Presentation
  India Habitat Centre (IHC), New Delhi, India
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Serial Vickrey Rule : Strategy-proof and Efficient Rule for Heterogeneous Indivisibles2011
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa
- Organizer
  Salvador Barbera 65' Workshop on" Votes and Incentives : The Design of Institutions"
- Place of Presentation
  Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Presentation] Serial Vickrey Rule : Strategy-proof and Efficient Rule for Heterogeneous Indivisibles2011
- Author(s)
  S.Serizawa
- Organizer
  Salvador Barbera 65' Workshop on "Votes and Incentives : The Design of Institutions"
- Place of Presentation
  Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Serial Vickrey Rule : Strategy-proof and Efficient Rule for Heterogeneous Indivisibles2011
- Author(s)
  S.Serizawa
- Organizer
  Salvador Barbera 65' Workshop on "Votes and Incentives : The Design of Institutions"
- Place of Presentation
  Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner cutting2011
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Asia Pacific Meeting of the ESA
- Place of Presentation
  University of Melbourne, (Australia)
- Year and Date
  2011-02-20
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner cutting2010
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  presented at Asia Pacific Meeting of the ESA
- Place of Presentation
  University of Melbourne
- Year and Date
  2010-02-20
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Presentation] Maximal domain for strategy-proof rule in multi-object social choice model2010
- Author(s)
  S.Serizawa
- Organizer
  Tenth International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
- Place of Presentation
  State University-higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
- Year and Date
  2010-07-22
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner cutting2010
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  Asia Pacific Meeting of the ESA
- Place of Presentation
  University of Melbourne
- Year and Date
  2010-02-20
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
[Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting2010
- Author(s)
  S. Serizawa
- Organizer
  2010 Asia Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association
- Place of Presentation
  オーストラリア・メルボルン大学
- Year and Date
  2010-02-20
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
[Presentation] Procurement Auction with Corner-cutting2008
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  第13回上海交通大学との学術交流セミナー Session II E Advances in Game and Social Choice Theory
- Year and Date
  2008-10-08
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530143
[Presentation] Procurement Auction with Corner-cutting2008
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  第13回上海交通大学との学術交流セミナー,Session II E Advances in Game and Social Choice Theory
- Year and Date
  2008-10-08
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Presentation] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules2006
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  The Eighth International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
- Place of Presentation
  Istanbul
- Year and Date
  2006-07-16
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
[Presentation] Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment: Impossibility Theorems
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  日本経済学会2014年度秋季大会
- Place of Presentation
  西南学院大学
- Year and Date
  2014-10-13 – 2014-10-14
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2014 SSK International Workshop on Distributive Justice in Honor of Professor William Thomson
- Place of Presentation
  Seoul National University
- Year and Date
  2014-10-17 – 2014-10-18
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  The 12th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
- Place of Presentation
  Boston College
- Year and Date
  2014-06-18 – 2014-06-21
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  CIREQ Montreal Matching Conference
- Place of Presentation
  CIREQ
- Year and Date
  2014-03-20 – 2014-03-21
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
[Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences
- Author(s)
  Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY
- Place of Presentation
  University of Sao Paulo
- Year and Date
  2014-07-25 – 2014-07-31
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061

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Serizawa Shigehiro 芹澤 成弘

SERIZAWA Shigehiro 芹澤 成弘

芹澤 茂弘 セリザワ シゲヒロ

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マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装Principal Investigator

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International Joint Research on Market DesignPrincipal Investigator

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International Comparison of Research Productivity of EconomicsPrincipal Investigator

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Study of Evaluating Research Productivity of Japanese Universities: Case of EconomicsPrincipal Investigator

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Allocation rules of indivisible goods and their applicationsPrincipal Investigator

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The Evaluation Indies of Academic Journals and the Productivity of Economics Research in JapanPrincipal Investigator

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Theories, experiments, and applications of mechanism designPrincipal Investigator

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The Productivity Analysis of Economics Research in JapanPrincipal Investigator

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Serizawa Shigehiro 芹澤成弘

SERIZAWA Shigehiro 芹澤成弘

芹澤茂弘セリザワシゲヒロ