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Serizawa Shigehiro  芹澤 成弘

ORCIDConnect your ORCID iD *help
… Alternative Names

SERIZAWA Shigehiro  芹澤 成弘

芹澤 茂弘  セリザワ シゲヒロ

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Researcher Number 90252717
Other IDs
External Links
Affiliation (Current) 2022: 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help 2004 – 2022: 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 教授
1999 – 2003: 東北大学, 大学院・経済学研究科, 助教授
1997 – 1998: 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 助教授
1994 – 1996: 滋賀大学, 経済学部, 講師
Review Section/Research Field
Principal Investigator
経済理論 / Economic theory / Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields / Economic statistics
Except Principal Investigator
Economic theory / 経済理論 / Humanities and Social Sciences / Economic statistics / Public finance/Monetary economics / Broad Section A / Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
Keywords
Principal Investigator
Strategy-Proofness / Social Choice Function / Pareto-Efficiency / 耐戦略性 / Game Theory / 経済実験 / オークション / 統計調査 / Incentive Compatibility / Voting … More / Public Good / Social Choice / Symmetry / メカニズム・デザイン / Uniform Rule / インパクト・ファクター / Article Influence Score / 学術誌 / 研究評価 / 引用数 / Social Choice Theory / Free Rider / Allotoment Economy / Pure Exchange Economy / 非分割財 / Anonymity / Vickrey Allocation Rule / マーケット・デザイン / Preferonce Domain / Strategy-Prodness / Individual Rationality / Symmtery / Mechanism Design / Minimal consumption Condition / 社会選択論 / 意思決定手続き / Respect for Unanimity / Same Sideness / Non-bossiness / Multidimensional Sigle-Peakedness / Matching / Respect for Pairwise Unanimity / 誘因両立性 / 研究業績 / 経済学 / インセンティブ / 戦略的虚偽表明の防止 / Bribe-proofness / 最大定義域 / 腎臓交換メカニズム / トップ・トレーディング / トップ・トレーディング・サイクル・メカニズム / Secure Implementability / 研究生産性 / 査読付き学術誌 / 被引用回数 / インパクトファクター / Research Productivity / Citation / Academic journal / Article Influence score / マーケットデザイン / マッチング / 対戦略性 … More
Except Principal Investigator
経済実験 / メカニズム・デザイン / 制度設計 / 法と経済学 / オークション理論 / メカニズムデザイン / 公共財供給 / オークション / 長期不況 / 行動経済学 / 制度設計理論 / マクロ経済学 / アンケート調査 / 資産選好 / 実験経済学 / 公共工事入札 / 公共工事入札制度 / 社会関係資本 / 環境 / 実験 / 国際比較 / 最小努力ゲーム / 信頼ゲーム / 協力 / ニューロサイエンス / 実験社会科学 / 社会的ジレンマ / リスク中立性 / 実験データ / ノンパラメトリックモデル / 確率分布 / アフィリエーション / ノンパラメトリック / 厚生経済学 / 公共工事 / 公共経済学 / 二重の基準論 / 不法行為法 / 法政策分析 / 法解釈学 / 手抜き工事 / 社会規範 / 不法行為 / 非家父長的利他性 / 分割不可能財 / 地球温暖化 / 環境問題 / 自己資本比率 / ナイト流不確実性 / インセンティブ / Mechanism Design / Non-Paternalistic Altruism / Indivisible Good / Global Warming / Environmental Problem / Optimal BIS Banking Regulation / Knightian Uncertainty / Incentive / 多数財オークション / 部分均衡モデル / 消費者余剰 / Vickrey型オークション / ワルラス型競争均衡 / 準線型選好 / MULTI-ITEM AUCTION / PARTIAL-EQUILIBRIUM MODEL / CONSUMER SURPLUS / 制度設計工学 / セキュア遂行 / ナッシュ / ピボタル・メカニズム / いじわる / 公共財 / ニューロエコノミックス / 協力の創発 / 拘泥 / ブレイスパラドックス / スパイト行動 / スパイト・アバージョン / セキュア・メカニズム / 支配戦略 / ナッシュ均衡 / グローブス・メカニズム / 前島 / MPFC / ポスト京都 / 上流還元型排出権取引制度 / 繰り返しゲーム / 談合 / 支配戦略均衡 / 排出権取引 / Engineering for Institutional Design / Secure Implementation / Nash / Pivotal Mechanism / Spiteful Behavior / Public Good / Nuerneconomics / Emergence of Cooneration / 資産効果 / 地位選好 / 貨幣選好 / 組織の経済学 / 格差拡大 / マッチング / アルゴリズム設計 Less
  • Research Projects

    (26 results)
  • Research Products

    (166 results)
  • Co-Researchers

    (38 People)
  •  マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装Principal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      2022 – 2026
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
    • Review Section
      Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  オークション理論のフロンティアと応用

    • Principal Investigator
      孫 寧
    • Project Period (FY)
      2021 – 2025
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
    • Review Section
      Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Economic stagnation and widening wealth inequality: Crises of the world economy and a construction of a unified macroeconomic theory

    • Principal Investigator
      小野 善康
    • Project Period (FY)
      2020 – 2024
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S)
    • Review Section
      Broad Section A
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  International Joint Research on Market DesignPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      2020 – 2024
    • Research Category
      Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (Fostering Joint International Research (B))
    • Review Section
      Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  International Comparison of Research Productivity of EconomicsPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      2019 – 2022
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Research (Exploratory)
    • Review Section
      Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Study of Evaluating Research Productivity of Japanese Universities: Case of EconomicsPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Project Period (FY)
      2016 – 2018
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Behavioral-Economic Analysis of Long-Run Stagnation

    • Principal Investigator
      Ono Yoshiyasu
    • Project Period (FY)
      2015 – 2019
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Allocation rules of indivisible goods and their applicationsPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Project Period (FY)
      2015 – 2019
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  The Evaluation Indies of Academic Journals and the Productivity of Economics Research in JapanPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Project Period (FY)
      2013 – 2015
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Theories, experiments, and applications of mechanism designPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      SERIZAWA SHIGEHIRO
    • Project Period (FY)
      2010 – 2014
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  The Productivity Analysis of Economics Research in JapanPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      SERIZAWA Shigehiro
    • Project Period (FY)
      2010 – 2012
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
    • Research Field
      Economic statistics
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Law and Economics, and Mechanism Design

    • Principal Investigator
      TSUNEKI Atsushi
    • Project Period (FY)
      2009 – 2011
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Public finance/Monetary economics
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Role of Social Capital and its Construction

    • Principal Investigator
      SHIMIZU Kazumi, YAMATO Takehiko
    • Project Period (FY)
      2007 – 2012
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research on Priority Areas
    • Review Section
      Humanities and Social Sciences
    • Research Institution
      Waseda University
      Tokyo Institute of Technology
  •  オークション理論における統計的推測と実証分析

    • Principal Investigator
      大屋 幸輔
    • Project Period (FY)
      2007 – 2008
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Exploratory Research
    • Research Field
      Economic statistics
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Strategy-Proof Social Choice Rules in the International SocietyPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      SERIZAWA Shigehiro
    • Project Period (FY)
      2006 – 2008
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Law and Economics and Mechanism Design

    • Principal Investigator
      TSUNEKI Atsushi
    • Project Period (FY)
      2005 – 2008
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Engineering for Institutional Design : Building up a new field

    • Principal Investigator
      SAIJO Tatsuyoshi
    • Project Period (FY)
      2004 – 2007
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
  •  Strategy-proof rules in the international SocietyPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      SERIZAWA Shigehiro
    • Project Period (FY)
      2003 – 2005
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University
      Tohoku University
  •  RESEARCH ON MULTI-ITEM AUCTIONS

    • Principal Investigator
      MIYAKE Mitsunobu
    • Project Period (FY)
      2002 – 2005
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      TOHOKU UNIVERSITY
  •  国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      2001 – 2002
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Tohoku University
  •  Mechanism Design Theory and its Application to various Models

    • Principal Investigator
      HORI Hajime
    • Project Period (FY)
      2000 – 2002
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Tohoku University
  •  国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止す社会的意志決定手続きPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      1999 – 2000
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Tohoku University
  •  国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      1997 – 1998
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Shiga University
  •  国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      1996
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Shiga University
  •  国際社会において戦略的行動を抑止する社会的意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      1995
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Shiga University
  •  国際社会において、戦略的行動を抑止する意志決定手続きについてPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      1994
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Encouragement of Young Scientists (A)
    • Research Field
      経済理論
    • Research Institution
      Shiga University

All 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Other

All Journal Article Presentation

  • [Journal Article] A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects2022

    • Author(s)
      Yuya Wakabayashi,Ryosuke Sakai,Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1161

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects2021

    • Author(s)
      Ryosuke Sakai,Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University

      Volume: 1134

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2021

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa,Takehito Masuda,Toyotaka Sakai,Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      Experimental Economics

      Volume: Forthcoming

    • NAID

      40022512466

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] A Characterization of the Vickery Rule in Slot Allocation Problems2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1120

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects2021

    • Author(s)
      Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: -

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-021-01333-y

    • NAID

      40022512451

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19J10221, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系4附置研究所及び シンガポール国立大学経済学部、 香港大学経営経済学部の 研究生産性比較調査(2020年)2021

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘、柴田章久、高橋悟
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research

      Volume: 1129 Pages: 1-9

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K21695
  • [Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系4附置研究所及び シンガポール国立大学経済学部、 香港大学経営経済学部の 研究生産性比較調査(2020年)2021

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘, 柴田章久, 高橋悟
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper No. 1129

      Volume: ー Pages: 1-9

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K21695
  • [Journal Article] A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems2021

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu、Chun Youngsub、Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Journal Title

      International Journal of Economic Theory

      Volume: 18 Pages: 38-49

    • DOI

      10.1111/ijet.12306

    • NAID

      120007191383

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1116

    • NAID

      40022515556

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系4附置研究所及び シンガポール国立大学経済学部、 香港大学経営経済学部の 研究生産性比較調査(2019年)2020

    • Author(s)
      Koichi Futagami, Kazuya Kamiya, Shigehiro Serizawa, Akihisa Shibata and Satoru Takahashi
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper No. 1086

      Volume: - Pages: 1-8

    • NAID

      40022347491

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K21695
  • [Journal Article] On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy2020

    • Author(s)
      Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Masso, and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1112

    • NAID

      40022512509

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] The Net Effect of Advice on Strategy-Proof Mechanisms: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2020

    • Author(s)
      Masuda Takehito, Mikami Ryo, Sakai Toyotaka, Serizawa Shigehiro, Wakayama Takuma
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1109

    • NAID

      40022512466

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] Mechanism design without quasilinearity2020

    • Author(s)
      Kazumura Tomoya、Mishra Debasis、Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Journal Title

      Theoretical Economics

      Volume: 15 Pages: 511-544

    • DOI

      10.3982/te2910

    • NAID

      40022346995

    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2020

    • Author(s)
      Kazumura Tomoya、Mishra Debasis、Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Economic Theory

      Volume: 188 Pages: 105036-105036

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036

    • NAID

      40022346990

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] Mechanism Design without Quasilinearity2020

    • Author(s)
      Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Theoretical Economics

      Volume: 15 Pages: 511-544

    • NAID

      40022346995

    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Journal Article] A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2019

    • Author(s)
      Takehito Masuda, Toyataka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper, Osaka University

      Volume: 1048 Pages: 1-22

    • NAID

      40022347266

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] The Role of Characterizations in Market Design2019

    • Author(s)
      James Schummer and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      In: Laslier, JF., Moulin, H., Sanver, M., Zwicker, W. (eds) The Future of Economic Design. Studies in Economic Design. Springer, Cham.

      Volume: 2019.11 Pages: 201-211

    • DOI

      10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_28

    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper, Osaka University

      Volume: 1047 Pages: 1-53

    • NAID

      40022347261

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] A Strategy-Proof Mechanism should be Announced to be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2019

    • Author(s)
      Takehito Masuda, Toyotaka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 2019.11, No.1048

    • NAID

      40022347266

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Journal Article] 経済・社会科学系5附置研究所 及びシンガポール国立大学経済学部の研究生産性比較調査(2018 年)2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Journal Title

      2018年大阪大学社会経済研究所活動報告

      Volume: - Pages: 18-24

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K13352
  • [Journal Article] A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction2018

    • Author(s)
      Takehito Masuda, Toyataka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1048

    • NAID

      40022347266

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear and Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: - Pages: 327-363

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019

    • NAID

      40022346745

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Journal Article] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1047

    • NAID

      40022347261

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Journal Article] 9大学経済学研究科・附置研究所の研究生産性比較調査(2016年)2017

    • Author(s)
      Koichi Futagami, Kazuya Kamiya, Shigehiro Serizawa and Akihisa Shibata
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 2017.4, No.998 Pages: 1-11

    • NAID

      40022347041

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K13352
  • [Journal Article] Mechanism Design without Quasilinearity2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa, Tomoya Kazumura and Debasis Mishra
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper

      Volume: No.1005 Pages: 1-60

    • NAID

      40022346995

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] 9大学経済学研究科・附置研究所の研究生産性比較調査(2016年)2017

    • Author(s)
      二神孝一、神谷和也、芹澤成弘、柴田章久
    • Journal Title

      大阪大学社会経済研究所、Discussion Paper

      Volume: 998 Pages: 1-9

    • NAID

      40022347041

    • Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16K13352
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Auction Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Tomoya Kazumura, *Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper,

      Volume: 1001 Pages: 1-40

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Auction Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa, Tomoya Kazumura and Debasis Mishra
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper

      Volume: No.1001 Pages: 1-41

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi-demand Preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Tomoya Kazumura, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 47(3) Pages: 633-663

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8

    • NAID

      40022346582

    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-14J05972
  • [Journal Article] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015

    • Author(s)
      Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper, ISER, No 943

      Volume: 943 Pages: 1-25

    • NAID

      40022346582

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule2015

    • Author(s)
      Shuhei Morimoto and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Theoretical Economics

      Volume: 10(2) Pages: 445-487

    • DOI

      10.3982/te1470

    • Peer Reviewed / Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-13J02188
  • [Journal Article] 5大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査(2014年)2015

    • Author(s)
      二神孝一 神谷和也 芹澤成弘 柴田章久
    • Journal Title

      経済セミナー

      Volume: 684号 Pages: 71-77

    • NAID

      40022346483

    • Acknowledgement Compliant
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25590045
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Non-quasi-linear Preferences: a Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2015

    • Author(s)
      Shuhei Morimotoy, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Theoretical Economics

      Volume: 印刷中

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Journal Article] Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment: Impossibility Theorems2015

    • Author(s)
      Hikaru Kondo and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER DP

      Volume: 927 Pages: 1-12

    • NAID

      40022346442

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Journal Article] 5大学経済学研究科及び附置研究所の研究業績比較調査(2014年)2015

    • Author(s)
      二神孝一、神谷和也、芹澤成弘、柴田章久
    • Journal Title

      大阪大学社会経済研究所、Discussion Paper

      Volume: 934 Pages: 1-7

    • NAID

      40022346483

    • Acknowledgement Compliant / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-25590045
  • [Journal Article] A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model2014

    • Author(s)
      Kantaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      International Journal of Game Theory

      Volume: 43 Pages: 153-168

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061, KAKENHI-PROJECT-24830109
  • [Journal Article] A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Goods and Agents2013

    • Author(s)
      Shuhei Morimoto , Stephen Ching and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 40 Pages: 871-911

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-011-0648-9

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2012

    • Author(s)
      S. Morimoto and S. Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 852 Pages: 1-47

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Journal Article] Characterizing Vickrey Allocation Rule by Anonymity2012

    • Author(s)
      I.Ashlagi, S.Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 38 Pages: 531-542

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-011-0535-4

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300, KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Journal Article] The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions inJapan; Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output2011

    • Author(s)
      S.Serizawa, K.Futagami, K.Kamiya, S.Ohta, Y.Sawada, A.Shibata
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: No.802

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22653028
  • [Journal Article] The Research Rankings of Major Economics Departments and Institutions in Japan; Evaluation by the Publications and Citation Output2011

    • Author(s)
      S.Serizawa, K.Futagami, K.Kamiya, S.Ohta, Y.Sawada, A.Shibata
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: No.802

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22653028
  • [Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010

    • Author(s)
      Shohei Takagi and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Pages: 245-266

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] An Impossibility Theorem for Matching Problems2010

    • Author(s)
      S.Serizawa, S.Takagi
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 35 Pages: 245-266

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Journal Article] An Impossibility Theorem for Matching Problems2010

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa and S. Takagi
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: Vol.35, No.2 Pages: 245-266

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010

    • Author(s)
      Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming)

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010

    • Author(s)
      Shohei Takagi1, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] An impossibility theorem for matching problems2010

    • Author(s)
      Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 35 Pages: 245-266

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling : Theoretical and Experimental Results2009

    • Author(s)
      Robert F.Veszteg, Kenju Akai, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Osaka University, ISER Discussion Paper 747

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Journal Article] Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods2009

    • Author(s)
      Kentaro Hatsumi and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: Volume 33 Pages: 423-447

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices2009

    • Author(s)
      K. Akai, T. Saijo and S. Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      SER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 743

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Journal Article] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting, Osaka University2009

    • Author(s)
      Kenju Akai, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research, Discussion No.740

      Pages: 18-18

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530143
  • [Journal Article] Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods2009

    • Author(s)
      Kentaro Hatsumi, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare Volume33,Number3

      Pages: 423-447

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] An Experimental Study of Japanese Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices2009

    • Author(s)
      Kenju Akai, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Osaka University, ISER Discussion Paper 743

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Journal Article] Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods2009

    • Author(s)
      Kentaro Hatsumi, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare 33

      Pages: 423-447

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies with Homogeneous Indivisible Goods2009

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa, K. Hatsumi
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: Vol.33, No.3 Pages: 423-447

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Journal Article] Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling : Theoretical and Experimental Results2009

    • Author(s)
      R F. Veszteg, K. Akai, T. Saijo and S. Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 747

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Journal Article] Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect2008

    • Author(s)
      Hiroki Saitoh, and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Economic Theory Vol.35, No.2

      Pages: 391-401

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Journal Article] Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect2008

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa, and Hiroki Saitoh
    • Journal Title

      Economic Theory Vol.35, No.2

      Pages: 391-401

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530143
  • [Journal Article] COALITIONALLY STRATEGY-ROOF RULES IN ALLOTMENT ECONOMIES OF HOMOGENEOUS INDIVISIBLE GOODS2008

    • Author(s)
      Hatsumi, K. and Serizawa, S
    • Journal Title

      Social choice and Welfare (online first)

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Journal Article] Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction2007

    • Author(s)
      Soo Hong, Chew, and Serizawa, Shigehiro
    • Journal Title

      Economic Theory Vol.33, No.2

      Pages: 393-406

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006

    • Author(s)
      Mizobuchi, H., Serizawa, S
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare Vol.27, No.1

      Pages: 195-210

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey allocation Rule2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper No.648 March

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
  • [Journal Article] Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation2006

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa, Shigehiro
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare Vol.26, No.2

      Pages: 305-331

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006

    • Author(s)
      Mizobuchi, M., Serizawa S.
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming)

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
  • [Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006

    • Author(s)
      Mizobuchi, Hideyuki, and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare Vol.27, No.1

      Pages: 195-210

    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Journal Article] "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation"2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare (掲載予定)

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
  • [Journal Article] "Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation"2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare 26

      Pages: 305-331

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(和文)」より
    • Peer Reviewed
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper, March

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
  • [Journal Article] An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems2006

    • Author(s)
      Shohei Takagi, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper, December No.677

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Journal Article] Pairwise Strategy-Proofiaess and Self-Enforcing Manipulation2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro, Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule2006

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa, S.
    • Journal Title

      Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Discussion Paper No.648 March

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods : A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      No.648(Osaka University, Discussion Paper)

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies2006

    • Author(s)
      Mizobuchi, H., Serizawa, S.
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare Vol.27, No 1

      Pages: 195-210

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-16203012
  • [Journal Article] Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction2005

    • Author(s)
      Chew Soo Hong, 芹澤成弘
    • Journal Title

      大阪大学社会経済研究所 Discussion paper No.631

      Pages: 1-11

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-14530001
  • [Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economy2005

    • Author(s)
      Hideyuki Mizobuchi, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Osaka University, ISER, Discussion Paper No.628(in press)

    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
  • [Journal Article] Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies

    • Author(s)
      Mizobuchi, M, Serizawa, S.
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare (forthcoming)

    • Description
      「研究成果報告書概要(欧文)」より
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530114
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      Economic Seminar
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      2019 Conference on Economic Design
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      The 19th Annual SAET Conference
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2019 NANJING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY & THE SIXTH MICROECONOMICS WORKSHOP
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2019

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Conference in Honor of John Weymark
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      2019 NANJING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY & THE SIXTH MICROECONOMICS WORKSHOP
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      The 19th Annual SAET Conference
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      Conference in Honor of John Weymark
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2019 Conference on Economic Design
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      MICROECONOMICS SEMINAR, Universidad Carlos III at Madrid, Madrid
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Equilibrium in the Assignment Market2019

    • Author(s)
      芹澤成弘
    • Organizer
      III SPAIN-JAPAN MEETING ON ECONOMIC THEORY
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      Market Design Seminar
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      Market Design Seminar, Stanford University
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Mechanism Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with Non-Quasiliner Preferences2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      HSI2018 4th Hitotsubashi Summer Institute
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof MultiObject Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      International Conference on Public Economic Theory 2018, Hue University
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Mechanism Design: Ex-Post Revenue Maximization with Non-Quasiliner Preferences2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      HSI2018--4th Hitotsubashi Summer Institute
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      Workshop on Information and Incentives, University of Malaga
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with no Wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      The 3rd Glasgow workshop on Mechanism Design and Behavioural Economics
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2018
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof Multi-Object Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      Microeconomics seminar, Korea University
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society 2018, DC Davis
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design, Durham University Business School
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: expost revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      WORKSHOP ON INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      The 14th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      International Conference on Public Economic Theory 2018
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof MultiObject Allocation: Ex-post Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2018

    • Author(s)
      芹澤 成弘
    • Organizer
      International Conference on Economic Theory and Applications, 西南財経大学
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2017 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Lisbon
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey algorithms2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2017 European Meeting of the Econometric Society
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with Equal Treatment of Equals and No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for General Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithms2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      13th European Meeting on Game Theory, Paris
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with no Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory, Seville
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Nanjing International Conference on Game Theory and the Fourth Microeconomics Workshop, Nanjing
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2017 Nanjing International Conference on Game Theory & the Fourth Microeconomics Workshop
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      18th Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory, Paris
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey algorithms2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      13th European Meeting on Game Theory
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Microeconomic Seminar
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Multi-object auction design: revenue maximization with no wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      18th Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2017 Conference on Economic Design, York
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Multi-Object Auction Design: Revenue Maximization with No Wastage2017

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2017 Conference on Economic Design
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (with Kazumura T.)2016

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa S.
    • Organizer
      Seminar
    • Place of Presentation
      Singapore Management University, Singapore
    • Year and Date
      2016-03-29
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      13th International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      Lund University, Lund, SWEDEN
    • Year and Date
      2016-06-28
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      The 13th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      Lund University, Lund, SWEDEN
    • Year and Date
      2016-06-28
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Equal Treatment of Equals and Strategy-proofness in Object Allocation with Non-quasi-linear Preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Advances in Mechanism Design
    • Place of Presentation
      NYUAD Campus, Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi
    • Year and Date
      2016-12-17
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-linear and Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule.2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      SMU WORKSHOP ON MECHANISM DESIGN
    • Place of Presentation
      Singapore Management University, Singapore
    • Year and Date
      2016-12-14
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasilinear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      III MOMA Group Meeting
    • Place of Presentation
      Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
    • Year and Date
      2016-09-23
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (with Kazumura T.)2016

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa S.
    • Organizer
      Seminar
    • Place of Presentation
      Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, India
    • Year and Date
      2016-03-10
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2016 European Meeting of the the Econometric Society
    • Place of Presentation
      CICG Geneva, Geneva, Swiss
    • Year and Date
      2016-08-22
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] When are strategyproof and efficient rules possible in objects allocation with money?2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      The GAMES 2016 congress
    • Place of Presentation
      Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
    • Year and Date
      2016-07-24
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      GAMES 2016 - Fifth World Congress of the Game Theory Society, 34
    • Place of Presentation
      Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
    • Year and Date
      2016-07-24
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] When are Strategy-proof and Efficient Rules Possible in Object Allocation with Money?2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      UC Barkley Microeconomic Theory Seminar
    • Place of Presentation
      Department of Economics, UC Barkley, Berkeley, USA
    • Year and Date
      2016-02-01
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-linear and Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule.2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      SMU WORKSHOP ON MECHANISM DESIGN
    • Place of Presentation
      Singapore Management University, Singapore
    • Year and Date
      2016-12-14
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences (with Kazumura T.)2016

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa S.
    • Organizer
      II MOMA Meeting
    • Place of Presentation
      Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain
    • Year and Date
      2016-01-15
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasilinear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      III MOMA Group Meeting
    • Place of Presentation
      Universidad de Granada, Granada, Spain
    • Year and Date
      2016-09-23
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi-demand Preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Singapore Management University, School of Economics Seminar
    • Place of Presentation
      School of Economics, Singapore Management University, Singapore
    • Year and Date
      2016-03-29
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Equal Treatment of Equals and Strategy-proofness in Object Allocation with Non-quasi-linear Preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Advances in Mechanism Design
    • Place of Presentation
      NYUAD Campus, Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi
    • Year and Date
      2016-12-17
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation With Money? (with Kazumura T.)2016

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa S.
    • Organizer
      Seminar
    • Place of Presentation
      UC Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
    • Year and Date
      2016-02-01
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      EEA-ESEM 2016
    • Place of Presentation
      CICG Geneva, Geneva, Swiss
    • Year and Date
      2016-08-22
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] When are strategy-proof and efficient rules possible in objects allocation with money?2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2016 Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society
    • Place of Presentation
      Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
    • Year and Date
      2016-08-11
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] When are strategy-proof and efficient rules possible in objects allocation with money?2016

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2016 Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society
    • Place of Presentation
      Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
    • Year and Date
      2016-08-11
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation With Money? (with Kazumura T.)2015

    • Author(s)
      Serizawa S.
    • Organizer
      The Conference on Economic Design
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Year and Date
      2015-07-01
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      上海財経大学経済学部セミナー
    • Place of Presentation
      School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finace and Economics, Shanghai, China
    • Year and Date
      2015-11-24
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2015 SSK International Conference on Distributive Justice
    • Place of Presentation
      Hotel Ibis Seoul Myeong-Dong, Seoul, Korea
    • Year and Date
      2015-10-08
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] When are Strategy‐proof and Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation with Money?2015

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      IDGP 2015 Workshop, "Institutions, Decisions and Governmental Practices:  Theory, Simulations and Applications"
    • Place of Presentation
      Campus de Bellaterra-UAB, Barcelona, Spain
    • Year and Date
      2015-06-02
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Efficiency and Strategy-proofness in Object Assignment Problems with Multi Demand Preferences2015

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      南京大学経済学部セミナー
    • Place of Presentation
      Department of Economics, Nanjin University, Nanjin, China
    • Year and Date
      2015-11-20
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] When are Strategy-Proof And Efficient Rules Possible in Objects Allocation With Money?2015

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Conference on Economic Deasign 2015
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul Bilgi University, Istanbul, Turkey
    • Year and Date
      2015-07-01
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2014

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Academia Sinica-ISER workshop
    • Place of Presentation
      Academia Sinica Taiwan
    • Year and Date
      2014-04-01
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences2014

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Market Design Workshop
    • Place of Presentation
      Osaka University
    • Year and Date
      2014-09-30
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2013

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Workshops  University of Rochester
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Rochester
    • Year and Date
      2013-09-10
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule2012

    • Author(s)
      S. Morimoto and S. Serizawa
    • Organizer
      第18回DCコンファレンス(TCERミクロコンファレンス)
    • Place of Presentation
      関西大学千里山キャンパス
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] A Characterization of Simultaneous Ascending Rule: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences2012

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa
    • Organizer
      PET12 TAIPEI
    • Place of Presentation
      Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] A Characterization of Simultaneous Ascending Rule: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences2012

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Frontiers in Market Design: Matching Markets
    • Place of Presentation
      Centro Stefano Franscini, Monte Verita, Ascona, Switzerland
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] A Characterization of Simultaneous Ascending Rule: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences2012

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa
    • Organizer
      11th International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      India Habitat Centre (IHC), New Delhi, India
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey Rule : Strategy-proof and Efficient Rule for Heterogeneous Indivisibles2011

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Salvador Barbera 65' Workshop on" Votes and Incentives : The Design of Institutions"
    • Place of Presentation
      Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey Rule : Strategy-proof and Efficient Rule for Heterogeneous Indivisibles2011

    • Author(s)
      S.Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Salvador Barbera 65' Workshop on "Votes and Incentives : The Design of Institutions"
    • Place of Presentation
      Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey Rule : Strategy-proof and Efficient Rule for Heterogeneous Indivisibles2011

    • Author(s)
      S.Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Salvador Barbera 65' Workshop on "Votes and Incentives : The Design of Institutions"
    • Place of Presentation
      Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner cutting2011

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Asia Pacific Meeting of the ESA
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Melbourne, (Australia)
    • Year and Date
      2011-02-20
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner cutting2010

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      presented at Asia Pacific Meeting of the ESA
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Melbourne
    • Year and Date
      2010-02-20
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Presentation] Maximal domain for strategy-proof rule in multi-object social choice model2010

    • Author(s)
      S.Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Tenth International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      State University-higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
    • Year and Date
      2010-07-22
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner cutting2010

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Asia Pacific Meeting of the ESA
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Melbourne
    • Year and Date
      2010-02-20
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PLANNED-19046002
  • [Presentation] Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting2010

    • Author(s)
      S. Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2010 Asia Pacific Meeting of the Economic Science Association
    • Place of Presentation
      オーストラリア・メルボルン大学
    • Year and Date
      2010-02-20
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-21530300
  • [Presentation] Procurement Auction with Corner-cutting2008

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      第13回上海交通大学との学術交流セミナー Session II E Advances in Game and Social Choice Theory
    • Year and Date
      2008-10-08
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530143
  • [Presentation] Procurement Auction with Corner-cutting2008

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      第13回上海交通大学との学術交流セミナー,Session II E Advances in Game and Social Choice Theory
    • Year and Date
      2008-10-08
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules2006

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      The Eighth International Meeting of Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul
    • Year and Date
      2006-07-16
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-18530135
  • [Presentation] Notions of Anonymity for Object Assignment: Impossibility Theorems

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会2014年度秋季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      西南学院大学
    • Year and Date
      2014-10-13 – 2014-10-14
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      2014 SSK International Workshop on Distributive Justice in Honor of Professor William Thomson
    • Place of Presentation
      Seoul National University
    • Year and Date
      2014-10-17 – 2014-10-18
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      The 12th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      Boston College
    • Year and Date
      2014-06-18 – 2014-06-21
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      CIREQ Montreal Matching Conference
    • Place of Presentation
      CIREQ
    • Year and Date
      2014-03-20 – 2014-03-21
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • [Presentation] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency in Allocating Houses for Ranking Preferences

    • Author(s)
      Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS OF THE GAME THEORY SOCIETY
    • Place of Presentation
      University of Sao Paulo
    • Year and Date
      2014-07-25 – 2014-07-31
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22330061
  • 1.  AOYAGI Masaki (50314430)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 6 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 2.  SHIBATA Akihisa (00216003)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 4 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 6 results
  • 3.  YAMATO Takehiko (90246778)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 4.  WAKAYAMA Takuma (80448654)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 1 results
  • 5.  FUTAGAMI Kouichi (30199400)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 6 results
  • 6.  數村 友也 (50804960)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 7.  ZHOU YU (40807450)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 4 results
  • 8.  SAIJYO Tatsuyoshi (20205628)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 1 results
  • 9.  TSUNEKI Atsushi (10207425)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 10.  SHIMIZU Kazumi (20308133)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 11.  WATABE Motoki (40241286)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 12.  MIYAKE Mitsunobu (00190752)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 13.  Ono Yoshiyasu (70130763)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 14.  池田 新介 (70184421)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 15.  松島 法明 (80334879)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 16.  孫 寧 (30302384)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 17.  舛田 武仁 (80725060)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 2 results
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  • 18.  SHEN Junyi (10432460)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 19.  AOYAGI Masaki (50311430)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 20.  KAMIYA Kazuya (50201439)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 2 results
  • 21.  OHTA Souichi (60262838)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 2 results
  • 22.  SAWADA Yasuyuki (40322078)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 2 results
  • 23.  HORI Hajime (90004209)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 24.  AKITA Jiro (10302069)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 25.  KAMOIKE Osamu (60004199)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 26.  HAYASHIYAMA Yasuhisa (20260531)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 27.  大屋 幸輔 (20233281)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 28.  大西 匡光 (10160566)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 29.  石田 潤一郎 (40324222)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 30.  堀井 亮 (90324855)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 31.  敦賀 貴之 (40511720)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 32.  花木 伸行 (70400611)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 33.  山形 孝志 (20813231)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 34.  BRAGUINSKY SERGUEY (40868436)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 35.  朱 連明 (60770691)
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    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 36.  橋本 賢一 (70403219)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 37.  岡野 芳隆 (20513120)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 0 results
  • 38.  HATSUMI Kentaro
    # of Collaborated Projects: 0 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 1 results

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