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ZHOU YU  ZHOU YU

ORCIDConnect your ORCID iD *help
Researcher Number 40807450
Other IDs
Affiliation (Current) 2025: 名古屋大学, 経済学研究科, 准教授
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help 2023 – 2024: 名古屋大学, 経済学研究科, 准教授
2019 – 2022: 京都大学, 経済学研究科, 特定講師
2018: 早稲田大学, 高等研究所, 講師(任期付)
2017: 大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 特任助教(常勤)
Review Section/Research Field
Principal Investigator
Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related / Economic theory
Except Principal Investigator
Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields / Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
Keywords
Principal Investigator
Financial constraints / Auction and matching / Strategy-proofness / Efficiency / Auction / Auction algorithm / Education resource / Crowding effect / School choice / Market design … More / Experimental test / Multi-item auction / Core outcome / Stable outcome / Experiment / Stability and core / Competitive equilibrium / Mechanism design / experiment / Mechanism Design / strategy-proofness / non-quasi-linearity / incentive-compatiblity / efficiency / auction design / Characterizations / Price adjustment process / General preferences / Multi-object auction / Incentive compatibility / Non-quasi-linearity … More
Except Principal Investigator
経済実験 / マーケット・デザイン / 耐戦略性 / マッチング / オークション / マーケットデザイン / アルゴリズム設計 / オークション理論 / 対戦略性 Less
  • Research Projects

    (6 results)
  • Research Products

    (78 results)
  • Co-Researchers

    (9 People)
  •  School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and ExperimentsPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      ZHOU YU
    • Project Period (FY)
      2022 – 2024
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
    • Review Section
      Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
    • Research Institution
      Nagoya University
      Kyoto University
  •  マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      2022 – 2026
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
    • Review Section
      Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University of Economics
      Osaka University
  •  オークション理論のフロンティアと応用

    • Principal Investigator
      孫 寧
    • Project Period (FY)
      2021 – 2025
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
    • Review Section
      Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University of Economics
      Osaka University
  •  International Joint Research on Market Design

    • Principal Investigator
      芹澤 成弘
    • Project Period (FY)
      2020 – 2024
    • Research Category
      Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (Fostering Joint International Research (B))
    • Review Section
      Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
    • Research Institution
      Osaka University of Economics
      Osaka University
  •  Theory and Experiment of Efficient Multi-item Auctions with Financial ConstraintsPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      ZHOU YU
    • Project Period (FY)
      2019 – 2022
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
    • Review Section
      Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
    • Research Institution
      Kyoto University
  •  Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Auction Design Beyond Quasi-Linearity: Theory and ExperimentPrincipal Investigator

    • Principal Investigator
      ZHOU YU
    • Project Period (FY)
      2017 – 2018
    • Research Category
      Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
    • Research Field
      Economic theory
    • Research Institution
      Waseda University
      Osaka University

All 2024 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 2017

All Journal Article Presentation

  • [Journal Article] Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples2023

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: 140 Pages: 210-228

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011

    • NAID

      40022515556

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22K13364, KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062, KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653, KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Journal Article] Menu mechanisms2022

    • Author(s)
      Mackenzie Andrew、Zhou Yu
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Economic Theory

      Volume: 204 Pages: 105511-105511

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.jet.2022.105511

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027, KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Journal Article] Equilibria in matching markets with soft andhard liquidity constraints2022

    • Author(s)
      P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Working paper

      Volume: -

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Journal Article] Equilibria in matching markets with soft andhard liquidity constraints.2022

    • Author(s)
      P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Working paper

      Volume: -

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] Tract housing, the core and pendulum auctions2022

    • Author(s)
      Andrew Mackenzie, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Working paper

      Volume: -

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Journal Article] Tract housing, the core, and pendulum auctions2022

    • Author(s)
      Andrew Mackenzie, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Working Paper

      Volume: -

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Journal Article] Equilibria in matching markets with soft andhard liquidity constraints2022

    • Author(s)
      P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Working Paper

      Volume: -

    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Journal Article] Crowding in School Choice2021

    • Author(s)
      William Phan, Ryan Tierney, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper, Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University,

      Volume: No. E-21-006

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] Crowding in School Choice.2021

    • Author(s)
      William Phan, Ryan Tierney, Zhou Yu
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper No. E-21-006, Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

      Volume: 21-006

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Journal Article] Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints2021

    • Author(s)
      Jean-Jacques P. Herings, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      GSBE Research Memoranda , Maastricht University

      Volume: No. 013

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints2021

    • Author(s)
      Herings P. Jean-Jacques、Zhou Yu
    • Journal Title

      Working Paper

      Volume: -

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Journal Article] A Characterization of the Vickery Rule in Slot Allocation Problems2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1120

    • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MATCHING MODELS WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS2021

    • Author(s)
      Herings P. Jean‐Jacques、Zhou Yu
    • Journal Title

      International Economic Review

      Volume: Forthcoming Issue: 2 Pages: 777-802

    • DOI

      10.1111/iere.12550

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027, KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Journal Article] A Characterization of the Vickery Rule in Slot Allocation Problems2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      International Journal of Economic Theory

      Volume: Not decided

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Journal Article] A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems2021

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu、Chun Youngsub、Serizawa Shigehiro
    • Journal Title

      International Journal of Economic Theory

      Volume: 18 Issue: 1 Pages: 38-49

    • DOI

      10.1111/ijet.12306

    • NAID

      120007191383

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027, KAKENHI-PROJECT-20H05631, KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Journal Article] Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1116

    • NAID

      40022515556

    • Open Access
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Journal Article] An assignment model with local constraints: Competitive equilibrium and ascending auction2020

    • Author(s)
      Lijun Pan, Linyu Peng, Yu Zhou
    • Journal Title

      Economics Letters

      Volume: 188 Pages: 1-4

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108905

    • Peer Reviewed / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653, KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13681
  • [Journal Article] Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear and Common-Tiered-Object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: - Pages: 327-363

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.019

    • NAID

      40022346745

    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H05728, KAKENHI-PROJECT-15H03328, KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions2024

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      FSS-DECO Seminar (University of Macau)
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Crowding in School Choice2024

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      Seminar (Hongkong Baptist University)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Crowding in School Choice2024

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      Seminar (Hongkong Baptist University)
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Crowding in School Choice2024

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      Seminar (Hongkong Baptist University)
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions2024

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      FSS-DECO Seminar (University of Macau)
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Discrete Pricing in Multi-object Auctions2024

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      FSS-DECO Seminar (University of Macau)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural2023

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      2023 North American Summer Meeting
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Econometric Society
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22K13364
  • [Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural2023

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      2023 North American Summer Meeting
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou with Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory -22nd annual SAET Conference
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism2023

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu
    • Organizer
      2023 North American Summer Meeting
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: The Serial Vickrey mechanism2023

    • Author(s)
      Zhou Yu with Shigehiro Serizawa
    • Organizer
      Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory -22nd annual SAET Conference
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Tract housing, the core and pendulum auctions2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Workshop on Microeconomics and Game Theory
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (invited)
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Conference: the 21st Annual SAET Conference
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Conference: 2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints.2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the 21st annual SAET conference
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples .2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the 6th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory (invited)
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Crowding in School Choice2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 2022 SSCW meeting
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Crowding in School Choice2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 2022 SSCW meeting
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the 6th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design (invited)
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2022 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the 21st Annual SAET Conference (invited)
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] School Choice with Crowding2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 2022 Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22K13364
  • [Presentation] Tract housing, the core and pendulum auctions2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Workshop on Microeconomics and Game Theory
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Equilibria in Matching Markets with Soft and Hard Liquidity Constraints2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the 21st Annual SAET Conference (invited)
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Crowding in School Choice2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 2022 SSCW meeting
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 6th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the 6th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory (invited)
    • Invited / Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Tract housing, the core and pendulum auctions2022

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Workshop on Microeconomics and Game Theory
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Menu mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 48th Annual Conference of the European Associationfor Research in Industrial Economics (VIRTUAL).
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Menu mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 48th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society(VIRTUAL).
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      EEA-ESEM Meeting of the Econometric Society(VIRTUAL).
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      EEA-ESEM Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 2nd ISI-ISER Young Economists Workshop
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Menu mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2021 China Meeting of the Econometric Society
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Menu mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2021 China Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Menu mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The 48th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (VIRTUAL).
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Menu mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2021 China Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      North American Summer Meeting of theEconometric Society (VIRTUAL).
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      EEA-ESEM Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (VIRTUAL)
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples2021

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Nanjing-Osaka Economic Theory Workshop
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
  • [Presentation] Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints2020

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2020 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Serial Vickrey mechanisms2019

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      2019 Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Conference
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints2019

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Economic Theory Workshop, Hitotsubashi University
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints2019

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      The international conference Economic Design and Algorithms, Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russia
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13653
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      GSBE-ETBC seminar, Maastricht University
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey algorithms2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum Price Walrasian Equilibrium for General Preferences: Serial Vickrey Algorithms2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Society for Economic Design
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      the Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Int'l Joint Research
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Microeconomics seminar, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey algorithms2018

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      GSBE-ETBC seminar, Maastricht University, Netherlands
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2017

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2017

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      Hitotsubashi-Osaka Economic Theory Workshop
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • [Presentation] Minimum price Walrasian equilibrium for general preferences: Serial Vickrey mechanisms2017

    • Author(s)
      Yu Zhou
    • Organizer
      International Conference on Game Theory and the Fourth Microeconomics Workshop
    • Invited
    • Data Source
      KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06828
  • 1.  芹澤 成弘 (90252717)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
    # of Collaborated Products: 6 results
  • 2.  數村 友也 (50804960)
    # of Collaborated Projects: 3 results
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  • 3.  青柳 真樹 (50314430)
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  • 4.  舛田 武仁 (80725060)
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  • 5.  孫 寧 (30302384)
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  • 6.  岡野 芳隆 (20513120)
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  • 7.  若山 琢磨 (80448654)
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  • 8.  Serizawa Shigehiro
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  • 9.  Herings P. Jean-Jacques
    # of Collaborated Projects: 1 results
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