KAZUMURA TOMOYA 數村友也

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Kazumura Tomoya 數村友也

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Researcher Number	50804960
Other IDs
Affiliation (Current)	2025: 京都大学, 経済学研究科, 講師
Affiliation (based on the past Project Information) *help	2021 – 2024: 京都大学, 経済学研究科, 講師 2018 – 2020: 東京工業大学, 工学院, 助教 2017: 東京大学, 大学院経済学研究科(経済学部), 助教
Review Section/Research Field	Principal Investigator Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related / Economic theory Except Principal Investigator Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields / Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
Keywords	Principal Investigator メカニズムデザイン / 耐戦略性 / オークション / 制約付きマッチング / マッチング理論 / 安定性 / マッチング / 対称性 / 公平性 / 経済理論 … More / 統一価格オークション / 効率性 / 収入最大化 / 複数財オークション … More Except Principal Investigator 経済実験 / マーケット・デザイン / 耐戦略性 / マッチング / オークション / マーケットデザイン / アルゴリズム設計 / オークション理論 / 対戦略性 Less

Auction design with income effectsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  數村友也
- Project Period (FY)
  2024 – 2028
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Kyoto University
マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  2022 – 2026
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
- Review Section
  
  Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
  Osaka University
オークション理論のフロンティアと応用
- Principal Investigator
  
  孫寧
- Project Period (FY)
  2021 – 2025
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
  Osaka University
International Joint Research on Market Design
- Principal Investigator
  
  芹澤成弘
- Project Period (FY)
  2020 – 2024
- Research Category
  
  Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (Fostering Joint International Research (B))
- Review Section
  
  Medium-sized Section 7:Economics, business administration, and related fields
- Research Institution
  Osaka University of Economics
  Osaka University
Designing a matching mechanism under distributional constraintsPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Project Period (FY)
  2019 – 2023
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
- Review Section
  
  Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
- Research Institution
  Kyoto University
  Tokyo Institute of Technology
Study of multi-item auctionPrincipal Investigator
- Principal Investigator
  
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Project Period (FY)
  2017 – 2018
- Research Category
  
  Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
- Research Field
  
  Economic theory
- Research Institution
  Tokyo Institute of Technology
  The University of Tokyo

All 2023 2022 2018 2017

All Journal Article Presentation

[Journal Article] When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2022
- Author(s)
  Tomoya Kazumura
- Journal Title
  
  Kyoto University Graduate School of Economics Discussion paper series
  
  Volume: E-32-008 Pages: 1-81
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-19K13643
[Journal Article] Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects2018
- Author(s)
  Tajika Tomoya、Kazumura Tomoya
- Journal Title
  
  International Journal of Game Theory
  
  Volume: 印刷中 Issue: 2 Pages: 543-569
- DOI
  10.1007/s00182-018-0641-y
- Peer Reviewed
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06590
[Journal Article] Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2017
- Author(s)
  Tomoya Kazumura, Debasis Mishra, Shigehiro Serizawa
- Journal Title
  
  ISER Discussion paper
  
  Volume: N0. 1001 Pages: 1-40
- Open Access
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-17H06590
[Presentation] A Characterization of the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price without quasilinearity2023
- Author(s)
  Debasis Mishra with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting (NASM)
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Organizer
  Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] A Characterization of the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price without quasilinearity2023
- Author(s)
  Debasis Mishra with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting (NASM)
- Invited / Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-23K20589
[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Organizer
  Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062
[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Organizer
  Conference on Economic Design
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-20KK0027
[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023
- Author(s)
  Kazumura Tomoya
- Organizer
  2023 North American Summer Meeting
- Int'l Joint Research
- Data Source
  KAKENHI-PROJECT-22H00062

1. 芹澤成弘 (90252717)

# of Collaborated Projects: 3 results

# of Collaborated Products: 2 results
2. ZHOU YU (40807450)

# of Collaborated Projects: 3 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results
3. 青柳真樹 (50314430)

# of Collaborated Projects: 2 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results
4. 舛田武仁 (80725060)

# of Collaborated Projects: 2 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results
5. 孫寧 (30302384)

# of Collaborated Projects: 2 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results
6. 岡野芳隆 (20513120)

# of Collaborated Projects: 1 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results
7. 若山琢磨 (80448654)

# of Collaborated Projects: 1 results

# of Collaborated Products: 0 results

KAZUMURA TOMOYA 數村 友也

Kazumura Tomoya 數村 友也

Research Projects

Research Products

Co-Researchers

Auction design with income effectsPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

マーケット・デザインの最先端研究と社会実装

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

オークション理論のフロンティアと応用

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

International Joint Research on Market Design

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

Designing a matching mechanism under distributional constraintsPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Review Section

Research Institution

Study of multi-item auctionPrincipal Investigator

Principal Investigator

Project Period (FY)

Research Category

Research Field

Research Institution

[Journal Article] When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2022

Author(s)

Journal Title

Data Source

[Journal Article] Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects2018

Author(s)

Journal Title

DOI

Data Source

[Journal Article] Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage2017

Author(s)

Journal Title

Data Source

[Presentation] A Characterization of the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price without quasilinearity2023

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] A Characterization of the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price without quasilinearity2023

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023

Author(s)

Organizer

Data Source

[Presentation] When can we design efficient and starategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?2023

Author(s)

KAZUMURA TOMOYA 數村友也

Kazumura Tomoya 數村友也